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Michael Gerhardt*
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the constitutional
significance of non-judicial precedent. Non-judicial precedent is an important
phenomenon not usually counted among the conventional sources of constitutional
meaning. The term, non-judicial precedent, encompasses the constitutional activities of
non-judicial actors. Non-judicial precedent has several distinctive features, which the
article describes and illustrates through various examples. First, non-judicial precedent is
more extensive than its judicial counter-part and more enduring than many scholars
suppose. Second, the binding effects of non-judicial precedent vary according to several
factors, including their direction – operating vertically as orders imposed by superior
upon inferior authorities or horizontally as persuasive authority across authorities with
equal power over the same domains. For instance, presidential signing statements
comprise a horizontal-horizontal non-judicial precedent, because they are merely
persuasive authority to Congress and other presidents. Non-judicial precedent also has
different impact over time. Moreover, non-judicial precedents, like judicial ones,
perform multiple functions, including shaping the Court, its doctrine, culture, and
national identity. The Article suggests that incorporating non-judicial precedent into the
lexicon of constitutional discourse will refine constitutional analysis and provide
important connections among seemingly disparate constitutional events that dominate our
headlines and fill our history books.
Introduction
When we think of precedent, we usually make a mistake. We usually assume precedent
is synonymous with the constitutional judgments of courts, particularly those of the Supreme
Court.1 This assumption derives from the common practice of viewing constitutional law from
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1 For how lawyers generally define precedent, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (Deluxe 8th
edition, 2004) (defining precedent alternatively as either “the making of law by a court in
recognizing and applying new rules while administering justice” or “a decided case that
2the Supreme Court’s perspective. Constitutional law casebooks and treatises focus on the
Court’s, not non-judicial actors’, decisions. 2 A common assumption among constitutional
scholars is that the Court handles the biggest questions in constitutional law.
This Article offers an alternative perspective on constitutional law by focusing on the
constitutional activities of non-judicial actors. Non-judicial actors make constitutional
judgments more frequently than courts do, and these judgments comprise precedents. Non-
judicial precedent covers a much broader spectrum than judicial precedent does. Non-judicial
precedent is the focus of every era’s constitutional conflicts, including current ones over judicial
appointments,3 empire building,4 Senate rule-making,5 warrant-less eavesdropping,6 presidential
signing statements,7 congressional oversight,8 and searches of representatives’ offices.9 Non-
judicial precedent is the common link among these and many other areas of constitutional law.
furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues”). For social
scientists’ conceptions of precedent, see, e.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II,
THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 5 (2006) (defining precedent as “the
legal doctrines, principles, or rules established by prior court opinions”).
2 For a notable exception, see, e.g., PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th edition, 2000).
3 See Charles Babington, Clash over Judicial Filibusters Nears Boiling Point, WASH. POST, May
9, 2005, at A21 (discussing Bush’s difficulty in getting his judicial nominations past the senate).
4 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915 (2005) (analyzing empire-building as a tool of constitutional analysis).
5 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Senate Nears the Point of No Return, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 4,
at 1 (discussing debate over the future of the Senate rule governing the filibuster).
6 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
7 See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His Office,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.
3By explicating the constitutional significance of non-judicial precedent, this Article seeks
to refine constitutional analysis in several ways. First, introducing non-judicial precedent into
the lexicon of constitutional discourse will improve the precision and clarity of the terms we
employ in constitutional analysis. I use the term ”precedent” to refer to prior constitutional
judgments of either or both judicial and non-judicial actors, while I use the term “non-judicial
precedent” to refer to all sets of constitutional decisions, values, and beliefs of non-judicial
actors. I shall use the term “constitutional law” to refer to what public authorities have declared
that the Constitution requires. Every non-judicial precedent is some past constitutional event.
Second, shifting perspective on constitutional law to the vantage point of non-judicial
precedent exposes the fallacy of complaints about the Court’s extreme “self-confidence” and
“arrogance” in exercising judicial review.10 Every constitutional question that the Court
considers has already been decided by at least one non-judicial authority, and the Court overturns
only a small fraction of the constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors that it chooses to
review. The Court leaves intact most constitutional judgments made by non-judicial actors.
8 See Drake Bennett, Can Congress Matter?: Congress, More than the Court, Scholars Say, Is
the Branch That’s Supposed to Keep Executive Power in Check: If It Has Failed, It Has No One
but Itself to Blame, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2006, at K1.
9 See Kathy Kiely, Both Party Leaders Decry Raid on Lawmaker’s Office, USA TODAY, May 25,
2006, at 4A.
10 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding the
“arrogance” of the majority’s ruling that the Eighth Amendment bars executions of people with
cognitive disabilities found guilty of certain crimes); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its
Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 288 (2001)
(claiming “[t]he Court’s self-confidence in matters constitutional is matched only by its disdain
for the meaningful participation of other actors in constitutional debate”); Samuel Issacharoff,
Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 55, 57 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (describing Bush v. Gore as a “swaggeringly
confident”).
4Third, the domain of non-judicial precedent dwarfs that of judicial precedent. Non-
judicial precedent is not merely the froth on the tidal wave of constitutional law; it constitutes
most of the wave. Through the creation, construction, and maintenance of precedent, non-
judicial actors exert great influence over the content and direction of constitutional law.11
Fourth, historical practices, tradition, and custom are not distinct activities to which
courts sometimes defer. Instead, each is a collection of non-judicial precedent, while together
they are overlapping sub-sets of “culture.”12
Fifth, non-judicial precedent, just like judicial precedent, performs multiple functions.13
Non-judicial precedent constitutes, among other things, a mode of argumentation, facilitates a
national dialogue on constitutional meaning, implements constitutional values, and shapes
culture, national identity, and the constitutional milieu in which public authorities operate.
This Article proposes a framework for explaining the role of non-judicial precedent in
constitutional law. Each part examines a distinctive feature of non-judicial precedent. Al-
together, non-judicial precedent’s features reflect its complex contributions to constitutional law.
11 On how non-judicial actors’ constitutional decision-making helps to construct constitutional
law, see generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
12 Robert Post of Yale Law School defines “culture” as the “beliefs and values of nonjudicial
actors.” Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term/ Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). Professor Post’s
definition of “culture” is quite insightful, but it may be too amorphous. Some beliefs and values
of non-judicial actors are more socially and politically salient than others. Consequently, I
consider “culture” as comprised of the aggregation, within our society, of all the discrete sets of
non-judicial actors’ various beliefs, values, and judgments on matters of constitutional law. I
consider each set to constitute a different category or collection of non-judicial precedent.
13 For a discussion of the multiple functions performed by judicial precedent, see generally
Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes about Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1761-1762 (2003)
(reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)).
5Part I examines the extraordinary variety and extensiveness of non-judicial precedent.
Non-judicial precedents differ in many ways. It may be categorized in such diverse terms as the
numerous institutions besides the courts creating precedent, the means through which non-
judicial authorities express their respective constitutional judgments, the different kinds of
precedents produced by non-judicial authorities, and the different sources of authority for the
constitutional judgments of non-judicial authorities.
Part II addresses the surprisingly extensive finality of non-judicial precedent. Contrary to
popular opinion, judicial review is limited. Indeed, much more often the constitutional
judgments of non-judicial review survive judicial review. For instance, judicial doctrines
recognize a broad swath for constitutional decision-making outside the Court. The standing and
political questions doctrines are two examples of the Court’s efforts to insulate some significant
questions of constitutional law from judicial review. Judges and justices are unlikely ever to
review numerous other important instances in which presidents and the Congress make
constitutional law. In addition, courts routinely defer to non-judicial precedent in certain forms,
such as historical practices, tradition, and customs. Moreover, courts rarely employ heightened
scrutiny in examining the constitutional activities of non-judicial actors. Courts usually use
deferential review of non-judicial constitutional activity, and eventually approve the vast
majority of the constitutional judgments of non-judicial authorities. Even when the Court uses
heightened scrutiny, it upholds a few non-judicial constitutional judgments. 
 Part III describes the direction, nature, and timing of non-judicial precedent’s influence.
Generally, non-judicial precedent exerts influence in one of two directions – vertically or
horizontally. Vertical influence entails the binding effect of an order, direction, or mandate
imposed by a superior authority on an inferior authority. Vertical operation entails binding
6authority imposed from the top-down usually within but sometimes across particular branches.
Horizontal influence entails the non-binding, or merely persuasive authority, of one authority’s
constitutional judgments across, or on, other authorities with equal power over the same domain.
While every non-judicial precedent fits within at least one of the four categories, some non-
judicial precedents fit into more than one category, depending on whether they operate
synchronically or diachronically. A precedent may have different impact across different
administrations and sessions of Congress.
In Part IV, I analyze the multiple functions of non-judicial precedent. Non-judicial
precedent performs many functions that judicial ones do.14 First, non-judicial precedents impose
limited path dependency on constitutional law – they rarely mandate certain outcomes. With no
firm rules for identifying, construing, or constructing non-judicial precedent, the latter is usually
framed to allow for easy manipulation by subsequent interpreting authorities. Yet, social science
research indicates that the more entrenched a precedent becomes – the more impervious it is to
challenge or dismantlement (either within or outside the Court) – the more path dependency it
may generate or the more it may constrain subsequent choices. While a non-judicial precedents
may not actually constrain (or preclude) much substantive constitutional decision-making they
do perform several other important functions, including fortifying or weakening judicial
doctrine, validating other sources of constitutional meaning and argumentation, facilitating a
broad public dialogue on constitutional law, chronicling constitutional history, clarifying
constitutional structure, and shaping American culture and national identity.
14 For a discussion of the different functions performed by judicial precedents, see generally
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. REV. 903,
967-88 (2005).
7Whereas the previous parts set forth a descriptive framework for explaining the
constitutional significance of non-judicial precedent, the final part considers normative criteria
for evaluating such precedent. It seeks to refine our standards for assessing the competency of
non-judicial actors to make constitutional decisions.
Employing well-known and not-so familiar examples of non-judicial precedent, this
Article shows that the Court may not be as supreme in making constitutional law as commonly
supposed. Instead, the proliferation, durability, and significance of non-judicial precedent
demonstrate the Court is supreme within a relatively narrow domain. Non-judicial actors are
supreme in making constitutional law within a larger realm than that in which the Court operates.
I. 
The Extraordinary Variety and Extensiveness of Non-Judicial Precedent
One distinctive feature of non-judicial precedent is its extraordinary variety and
extensiveness. I examine various ways in which this feature manifests itself.
A. The Extensive Variety of Non-Judicial Precedent. The eminent constitutional scholar
Philip Bobbitt has observed that “there are as many kinds of precedent as there are constitutional
institutions creating them.”15 In fact, numerous non-judicial actors produce precedents. Some of
these actors are familiar, including Congress and the President. Other non-judicial actors who
create less familiar precedent are cabinet and sub-cabinet officials and the heads of federal
agencies, commissions, and bureaus. Moreover, in each of the fifty states, a wide range and
large number of non-judicial authorities make precedent. These authorities include, among
15 Philip C. Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility:
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1383-84 (1994).
8others, governors and other executive officials (including attorneys general, cabinet-level, and
sub-cabinet officials), legislators, and administrative agencies. In localities around the country,
non-judicial authorities include city and county officials and their respective subordinates.
In many instances, private citizens and organizations interact with public officials to
make important contributions to constitutional law. First, there are the people who drafted the
United States Constitution – the Framers and the Ratifiers of the original Constitution and of
each of the subsequent 27 amendments. While the Framers drafted the Constitution behind
closed doors,16 the ratification process was a public event with many formal and informal
participants.17 These participants included not only the official representatives in state ratifying
conventions but also the people who sent them there as well as State authorities and newspapers.
Moreover, legal scholars, civil rights and other organized interest groups, and the American Bar
Association have all contributed significantly to constitutional dialogues – for instance, the
American Bar Association in evaluating judicial nominees and proposed legislation,18 and the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in commenting on nominations, sponsoring or
coordinating litigation, and lobbying for civil rights legislation.19 Today, numerous media
16 See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, 22-23 (1966).
17 See MICHAEL A. GILLESPIE & MICHAEL LIENESCH, INTRODUCTION TO RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 1 (Michael A. Gillespie and Michael Lienesch eds., 1989).
18 See generally THE ABA IN LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY: WHAT ROLE? (The Federalist Society for
Law & Public Policy Studies, eds., 1994) (surveying the participation of the ABA in making
policy decisions and recommendations on judicial nominees); see also Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth about the Judicial Selection Process: Each Is Entitled to
His Own Opinion, but Not to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 467, 477-479 (2003)
(discussing the role of the ABA in the judicial nomination process).
19 See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Urges Rejection of John D. Ashcroft
as Attorney General of the United States, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 22, 2001 available in 2001 WL
4139263; Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII
9outlets – television, radio, cable, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet – provide information
and commentaries on constitutional events, while the public expresses constitutional judgments
through voting, polling, and lobbying. Moreover, people’s constitutional judgments are shaped
in various settings inside and outside of the home.
B. The Diverse Expressions of Constitutional Judgments. The extraordinary variety of
ways in which non-judicial actors express constitutional judgments complicates the systematic
study of non-judicial constitutional activity. Studying the Court’s constitutional opinions is
appealing, at least in part, because they are relatively small in number. In fact, the Supreme
Court produces far fewer constitutional decisions each year than do non-judicial authorities such
as the Congress, the executive branch, the States, or localities.
Moreover, justices and judges express their constitutional opinions through much
narrower, more restrictive means than do non-judicial authorities. Whereas justices express their
constitutional opinions in their formal decisions and sometimes in speeches, articles, interviews,
and treatises, political leaders express their respective constitutional opinions through virtually
unlimited means. For instance, legislators express their constitutional judgments through such
diverse means as speeches, committee hearings and reports, floor statements, correspondence,
media interviews, campaign activities (including debates), editorials, articles, and books.
Whereas judges and justices are formally restricted from ex parte contacts,20 state and national
of the Civil rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 923-933 (1978) (noting that the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law contributed to early enforcement of Title VII through
litigation); Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State “Equal Access to Justice
Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 547, 555 (noting the Committee’s opposition to the Equal Access
to Justice Act).
20 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2005) (specifying the situations in which judges must disqualify
themselves).
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political authorities are not. Political leaders are restrained in the extent of their contacts
primarily by bribery and ethics laws.21 They are thus left substantial discretion over the kinds of
information they may consider in formulating their constitutional judgments, including the
people with whom they consult. Political authorities are the conduits for a nearly endless stream
of constitutional commentary. Party leaders, public intellectuals, pundits, academics, and
interest groups are just a few of the participants in this wide-ranging dialogue. In addition,
private organizations express their constitutional judgments through varied means, such as media
campaigns, lobbying, petitions, and official and informal appearances before governmental
bodies. Also, private citizens express their constitutional judgments through extensive means,
including voting and lobbying. The Internet provides extensive means for constitutional
dialogue through e-mails, websites featuring constitutional discussion, and blogging.22
C. The Different Kinds of Constitutional Judgments. A non-judicial precedent may
have three kinds of substantive content. The first is purely constitutional. Non-judicial
precedent with purely constitutional content consists of those decisions in which non-judicial
authorities directly address constitutional questions. An obvious example can be found in the
constitutional amendment process. Indeed, precedent guided the National Archivist in resolving
the legality of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.23 The amendment was first proposed in 1791,
but an insufficient number of states had voted to ratify the amendment by the end of the First
21 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.S. § 31-2 (2005) (providing no senator, “or the spouse or dependent
thereof, shall knowingly accept . . . any gift or gifts in any calendar year aggregating more than
the minimum value as established by section 7342(a)(5) of title 5, United States Code, or $250,
whichever is greater[,] from any person, organization, or corporation...”).
22 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (discussing, among other things, the
Internet’s potential as a forum and means for constitutional discourse).
23 U.S. CONST., amend. XXVII.
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Congress. Without any time-limit or deadline for ratification imposed by Congress, it was
unclear whether states joining the Union after the amendment was proposed were precluded from
voting on its ratification. By 1992, 38 states had ratified the amendment. Following precedent,
the national Archivist deferred to states’ decisions and certified the amendment’s adoption,24 and
Congress by joint resolution declared the amendment valid.
Another kind of substantive content for non-judicial precedent consists of mixed
questions of policy and constitutional law. The Senate’s rejection of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s controversial Court-packing plan exemplifies this kind of substantive content.
Senators cited a combination of reasons for their opposition, including both constitutional and
policy.25 Non-judicial precedents with mixed content are predicated on constitutional judgments
which are not always express.26
The third kind of substantive content for non-judicial precedent is primarily policy. Most
non-judicial precedents comprise policy choices. Voting on a tax increase is typical of such
content. Although the vote clearly pertains to a policy question, the approval of any policy may
be construed as an implicit acceptance of its constitutionality.
Non-judicial precedent may, however, differ according to the context in which it is made.
The range of activities potentially constituting non-judicial precedent abound. For instance, the
most familiar activity potentially requiring the exercise or expression of constitutional judgments
consists of formal floor votes in Congress. Votes occur with respect to the entire range of
24 See With Little Fanfare, Amendment Is Signed, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at A14.
25 See S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 13-14 (1937) (summarizing senators’ explanations for their
rejection of the Court-packing plan).
26 See Post, supra note 12, at 79-80 (arguing that constitutional inquiries often depend on legal as
well as social meanings).
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congressional exercises of powers. Moreover, the exercise of power within each chamber
encompasses decisions of the Parliamentarian and presiding officer in the House or Senate, or
the House or Senate itself, concerning how its respective rules operate in practice. These
precedents elaborate each chamber’s understanding of its rules.27 While not all of the latter
precedents pertain to constitutional law, the formulation, retention, and amendment of rules
depends on the members’ understanding of their power to formulate rules.
Members of Congress do not just create precedent through formal lawmaking or
rulemaking. They create precedent through inaction. Thus, members of Congress render
constitutional judgments when they vote against legislation they deem to be unconstitutional and
when they vote not to impeach or not to convict someone because they believe the misconduct at
issue does not qualify as an impeachable offense. They make precedent when they refuse to
declare war because they believe that it was not required by the Constitution under the
circumstances; and they make precedent when they vote against presidential nominations based
on their disapproval of the nominees’ constitutional opinions.
Indeed, most congressional activity occurs off the House and Senate floors. Legislative
committees create precedent through what they approve and disapprove. Nothing reaches the
floor of the House or Senate without first being considered in committee. Committees are
Congress’ gatekeepers.28 Usually, a committee’s lack of endorsement is fatal, though exceptions
27 See, e.g., Betsy Palmer, Changing Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or “Nuclear” Option,
CRS Report for Congress, April 5, 2005, at 1 (describing the presiding officer’s and institution’s
formal judgments on rules and their operation as governing “precedents” within the Senate).
28 Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An
Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740, 741-44 (1983).
13
are made through discharge petitions (requiring majority approval in the House and unanimous
consent in the Senate).29
Yet another form of congressional constitutional judgments consists of informal
practices, norms, and traditions.30 For instance, seniority has been a longstanding but not
binding criterion for committee assignments in the House and Senate.31 The practice constitutes
a continuing exercise of each chamber’s authority to “determine Rules for its proceedings.”32
Each chamber’s formal rules derive from the same explicit constitutional authority.
Presidents and other executive officials produce precedent in at least as many ways as
Congress does. One is through constitutional judgments made by presidents in the course of
exercising their unique authorities. For instance, President Jackson’s veto of the second National
Bank is one of the most famous statements and precedents bolstering the proposition that the
“opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of the Congress
than the opinions of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent
of both.”33 The different kinds of nominations made by presidents, as well as the manner in
which they are made, constitute additional sets of precedent.34
29 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CQ GUIDE TO CONGRESS 425 (3rd edition 1982) (explaining
the history and function of discharge petitions).
30 See, e.g., id. at 195-96 (discussing the “norm” of senatorial courtesy and other longstanding
practices of the Senate).
31 See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen Legislator, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 623, 662-663 (1996) (charting the peaks and valleys of the seniority system over the
course of the twentieth century).
32 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5.
33 ANDREW JACKSON, VETO MESSAGE, July 10, 1832, 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents
578-79 (Richardson ed., 1897). Jackson argued that the “authority of the Supreme Court must
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Presidents also decide how to structure their office.35 These decisions encompass choices
made about the appropriate sizes of and distribution of powers among presidential staffs. For
instance, President Nixon had only one White House counsel –John Dean – while President
George W. Bush has almost 20 people in the White House Counsel’s office.36 Other executive
officials create precedents through their exercises of their respective authorities. For instance,
the President may ask the Attorney General for formal advice on particular constitutional
questions.37 This advice is given in the form of official opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel
of the Justice Department.38 Both the advice and priorities of an Attorney General may produce
precedent for his successors to consider following or rejecting.
There are more diverse repositories of presidential and other executive officials’
precedents than congressional ones. The former include, among others, presidents’ executive
orders, federal regulations, and the official opinions and memoranda of legal counsel in every
not . . . be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.” Id.
34 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 162-74 (revised edition 2003) (discussing the patterns in the Senate’s
handling of different nominations).
35 See, e.g., 1 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 816 (Michael Nelson, ed. 2002) (describing President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to modernize the organization of the White House).
36 See Michael A. Fletcher, Quiet but Ambitious White House Counsel Makes Life of Law, WASH.
POST, June 21, 2005, at A19 (mentioning White House Counsel Harriet Miers’ staff of thirteen
lawyers); see also Dan Froomkin, 2004 White House Office Staff List, THE WASH. POST,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/administration/whbriefing/
2004stafflistc.html.
37 See 2 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 1220-1221 (Michael Nelson, ed. 2002) (describing the
changing priorities of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice through the Nixon,
Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations).
38 See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for
a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993).
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executive department and agency. Presidents and executive officials also render constitutional
judgments in the forms of informal practices, norms, and traditions. For instance, presidents
from Thomas Jefferson until Woodrow Wilson delivered their States of the Union by letter, but
Wilson inaugurated what has become the customary presidential practice of delivering the
address before a joint session of the Congress.39 The practice has enhanced the prestige of the
president. The choice of delivering the State of the Union is the consequence of presidents’
judgments about how they would like to deliver their address and Congress’ acquiescence.
State officials render constitutional judgments in as many different forms as federal
officials do. State constitutions are the States’ most prominent constitutional judgments; they
provide additional governmental obligations and powers beyond those the federal Constitution
requires.40 State law, for instance, generally sets forth the legal definitions of life, marriage, and
death.41 Moreover, in 2004, 18 states amended their state constitutions to expressly prohibit gay
marriage.42 In addition, state law defines the authority of State Attorneys General to issue legal
39 H.W. BRANDS, WOODROW WILSON 30-31 (2003) (noting that this innovation “was one of
[Wilson’s] lasting contributions to American governance”).
40 JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION, 12 (Jerry Menikoff, ed., 2001)
(“If…rights [created by a state constitution] are more expansive than those created by the United
States Constitution, then that state constitution will effectively limit the powers wielded by its
legislators.”).
41 See, e.g. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7180(a) (2005) (defining “death” as “irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions” and /or “irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain”).
42 See Anna Badkhen, In Massachusetts, Gay Weddings are Now Routine; Growing Acceptance
of Same-Sex Nuptials on First Anniversary, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 17, 2005, at A4.
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opinions.43 Because Governors usually do not appoint state Attorneys General, these officials
may disagree over constitutional issues, and some states have developed special processes for
resolving such disagreements.44 Moreover, state legislatures create precedent not unlike that
which Congress produces. All state legislators make judgments about legislation. Each state
constitution sets forth procedures for removing or recalling certain public officials for
misconduct in office, 45and many have procedures for evaluating, appointing, or re-appointing
judges. For instance, in 2003 the voters of California agreed to recall (and thus remove) then-
Governor Gray Davis and to replace him with the actor Arnold Schwarzenegger.46 In 2004,
Connecticut Governor John Rowland resigned when confronted with the enormous likelihood of
impeachment and removal for misappropriating funds,47 while New Jersey Governor James
43 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 61-75 (Lynne M. Ross, ed., 1990); see also Robert Toepfer, Some Legal
Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General to Advise, 19 U. CIN. L. REV. 201, 203 (1950).
44 For instance, former Virginia governor Doug Wilder appointed special legal counsel to
represent the Virginia Retirement System because he perceived that Mary Sue Terry, the attorney
general, would have a conflict of interests. Though Terry filed suit, the state assembly resolved
the impasse under Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-122(a) (1994) (current version at 2.2-510.1 (2006))
(specifying that the governor may appoint special counsel when the Attorney General’s office is
“unable” to render the service at issue).
45 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VII § 8 (disqualification from office; Bribery; Improper election
practices); MO CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 4 (impeachment and removal of officers not subject to
impeachment); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (disqualifications for office).
46 Charlie LeDuff, The California Recall: The Governor-Elect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at
A26.
47 William Yardley, Under Pressure, Rowland Resigns Governor’s Post, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2004, at Al.
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McGreevey resigned in anticipation of an effort to remove him based on charges that he had
sexually harassed a male employee and used his office to bestow favors upon the employee.48
Moreover, state law serves as the primary basis for the existence of some constitutionally
protected interests. Contracts Clause, Takings, Eighth Amendment, and Due Process cases
illustrate this aspect of state law. In cases requiring interpretation and application of the
Contracts Clause,49 courts need to determine whether a contract exists before deciding whether a
particular contractual obligation has been impaired. Whether a contract exists depends on the
relevant sate law on the formation of contracts.50 In cases involving construction of the Due
Process Clause51 or the Takings Clause,52 the Court consults state law to determine whether an
interest qualifies as “property”.53 Moreover, the Court must determine whether a particular
criminal sentence is “unusual” and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment54 by determining its
48 Laura Mansnerus, McGreevey Steps Down After Disclosing a Gay Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2004, at A1.
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall…pass any…Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts…”).
50 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 96 (1938); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
213, 256-59, 326 (1827).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law…”).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”).
53 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Fox River Paper v. Railroad Commission, 274 U.S. 651 (1927);
Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
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consistency with state punishment schemes.55 In substantive due process cases, the Supreme
Court defers to state practices or laws as establishing a benchmark against which to measure
whether the law or practice at issue comports with, or deviates from, tradition. In Lawrence v.
Texas,56 the majority found “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”57 The
Court found no tradition or “longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter”58 and thus overruled Bowers v. Hardwick59 because it had
mistakenly identified a tradition supporting the criminalization of homosexual activity.
Another kind of non-judicial precedent is each source of constitutional meaning besides
courts. Consider, for instance, the original understanding of the Constitution. There are many
sets of Framers. There are the original delegates to the Constitutional Convention and State
ratifying conventions as well as the pivotal actors in drafting and ratifying each of the subsequent
27 amendments to the Constitution. These Framers and Ratifiers established precedents for
constitution-making.60 Even unsuccessful amendments, such as the Equal Rights Amendment,
enrich our understanding of the amending process.
55 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
56 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57 Id. at 571-72.
58 Id. at 568.
59 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
60 See Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 533, 536-37 (1993) (assigning “major credit” to the United States for
“establishing and spreading the constitutionalist ideology”); see also ZELMAN COWEN & LESLIE
ZINES, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA xiv-xv (2d ed. 1978) (“The influence of American
precedents on Australian constitution making was considerable.”).
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The text of the Constitution functions as a precedent as well. For anyone interested in
constructing, or writing, constitution, the United States Constitution, including its amendments,
is a popular place to begin. It is the ultimate precedent. It is arguably the single most important
model for state constitutions and constitutions abroad. This is not to say that it is perfect or that
it is perfectly adaptable to other countries or societies.61 Nevertheless, it is a precedent – a
prominent example of earlier – constitution-making.
The structure of our Constitution is another precedent for constitution-drafting. The
division of our Constitution into three branches was not novel. The Framers drew on their
knowledge of antiquity and European political philosophy to distribute the powers of the federal
government among three different branches,62 and the system of checks and balances set forth in
the American Constitution has been a model not just for the states (whose own systems provided
some guidance to the Framers) but for governments around the world.63
Yet another kind of non-judicial precedent involves popular sovereignty. All the
different means through which the public expresses constitutional judgments comprise
61 For scholarly analysis of the United States Constitution as a model, see, e.g., J.M. Balkin,
Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703 (1997)
(exploring the notion of constitutional fidelity and the problem of constitutional evil);
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford
Levinson, eds., 1998); THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 200 YEARS OF ANTI-FEDERALIST,
ABOLITIONIST, FEMINIST, MUCKRAKING, PROGRESSIVE, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIALIST CRITICISM
(Bertell Ollman & Jonathan Birnbaum, eds., 1990).
62 See Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Act, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 58 (1985) (describing the
influences on the framers by various European and other political philosophers).
63 See, e.g., Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism in
Comparative Perspective, in 1 THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 119, 120 n.3 (Juan J.
Linz & Arturo Valenzuela, eds. 1994) (noting that in the 1980s and 1990s, “all the new aspirant
democracies in Latin American and Asia” chose governments modeled on the American system
of separation of powers).
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precedents of popular sovereignty. For instance, political campaigns provide significant
opportunities for public interaction with political leaders (and those seeking to unseat them) on
the constitutional issues of the day. Any way in which the public applies pressure to political
leaders can be construed as an exercise of popular sovereignty, and the history (and
consequences) of such pressure is an important part of our constitutional development.64
The constitutional judgments of non-judicial authorities further include enduring policy
judgments. National political leaders are responsible for the major policy developments and
judgments throughout American history. If one were to survey the 50 most important policy
developments in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court could not claim responsibility for any.
While judicial decisions helped the civil rights movement to flourish, they did so with the aid of
significant presidential and congressional activities,65 including the 1958 and 1964 Civil Rights
Acts.66 Nor should one forget that the private citizens helped to energize and direct the civil
rights movement as well as helped to create an important precedent for subsequent organized
activity to change the law.67 The civil rights movement, particularly the cohesive litigation
strategy to end state-mandated segregation, is the model for contemporary interest groups to
advance their agendas through litigation over such diverse issues as gay marriage, abortion
64 See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994).
65 See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
66 See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 71-634 (1957) and Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352 (1964).
67 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTOR 21 (1994) (citing the participation by Southern blacks in direct action protests as a
model for protest activities).
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rights, teaching evolution in public schools, and disability.68 Non-judicial actors make all these
judgments. Congress and the President share responsibility for the policy judgments embodied
in landmark legislation characterizing the New Deal69 and Great Society70 eras as well as the
Clean Air and Water Acts.71
D. The Explicit and Implicit Authorities of Congress and the Presidency. The
extensiveness of non-judicial precedent is illustrated further by the numbers and kinds of powers
of principal executive and legislative authorities in federal and state governments. One way to
measure the range of non-judicial precedents such officials make is to enumerate their
constitutionally granted powers. For instance, the Constitution explicitly vests Congress with 75
powers, presidents with 14, and vice-presidents with five. Each time that the President or
68 See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGANST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950 144 (1987) (describing a common perception of the NAACP’s litigation campaign as
a model for public interest law generally); see also Richard Thompson Ford, Courting Trouble:
A Story of Love, Marriage, and Litigation Strategy from Slate.com (June 1, 2004):
http://www.slate.com/id/2101537 (arguing that gay marriage activism in California failed b/c
parties in that state failed to follow litigation strategy established by Civil Rights…).
69 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at
29 USC §§ 151 et seq (1988)); Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 520
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1994)); National Industrial Recovery
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Norris-La Guardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat
70 (1932) (codified at 29 USC §§§ 101 et seq (1988)).
70 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)); Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2000)); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 2991-2994 (1994)).
71 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954; Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272,
79 Stat. 992 (1965)
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Congress exercises one of its respective powers, its exercise has the potential to become a
precedent to guide subsequent exercises of the same power. For instance, pursuant to express
authority set forth in Article I, the House of Representatives has excluded 10 people from being
seated because of their failures to satisfy the requirements for membership in the House,72
expelled four people,73 censured 22 members for misconduct,74 and reprimanded eight members
for misconduct, including Barney Frank and Newt Gingrich;75 and the Senate has excluded six
people from being seated,76 expelled 15 people,77 and reprimanded or censured nine people for
misconduct.78 Although these legislative decisions are routinely ignored in the study of
precedent, they guide each chamber in dealing with the ticklish problem of how to handle the
misconduct of members of the House and the Senate.
The powers of non-judicial actors differ in notoriety. Probably the best known executive
powers are the President’s authorities to act as “Commander-in-Chief” and to “take care that the
72 See ROBERT L. TIENKEN, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RELATING TO
EXCLUSION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, 1973); but see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (overturning
exclusion of Adam Clayton Powell on grounds that he wrongfully diverted House funds for the
use of others and himself and made false reports concerning expenditures of foreign currency)
73 Jack Maskell, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House
of Representatives, CRS Report RL 31382, 24-25 (2002).
74 Id. at 22-23.
75 Id. at 23-24.
76 ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY WOLFF, U.S. SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE
CASES, 1793-1990, S. DOC. NO. 103-33 xviii (1995).
77 Id. at xxviii.
78 Id. at xxix.
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Laws be faithfully executed”,79 both of which provide the textual foundation for the inherent
powers most presidents claim.80 The Vice-President’s authority to succeed to the presidency
upon the death of the President is now taken for granted, though it only took hold after
congressional leaders reluctantly accepted John Tyler’s claim that as Vice-President he was
constitutionally entitled to take the presidential oath upon the death of the sitting President,
William Henry Harrison.81 Another discounted power is Congress’ authority to enact copyright,
patent, and trademark legislation by virtue of its explicit authority “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”82 Congress effectively has the last word in
79 U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
80 See, e.g., Holdover and Removal of Members of Amtrak’s Reform Board, Sept. 22, 2003 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/amtrak.htm (arguing that President
Bush may remove a member from the Amtrak Reform Board without cause based on the Take
Care Clause); The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, Sept. 25, 2001 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (arguing that the President has plenary authority to
use military force abroad as Commander in Chief); Validity of Congressional-Executive
Agreements that Substantially Modify the United States’ Obligations under an Existing Treaty,
Nov. 25, 1996 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/treaty.top.htm
(claiming that the President’s authority in the field of foreign affairs flows largely from his role
as Commander in Chief); Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes,
18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994) (arguing that the President is sometimes entitled not to
enforce laws that he believes to be unconstitutional, under both the Take Care Clause and the
Commander in Chief power); Constitutionality of Statute Requiring Executive Agency to Report
Directly to Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 632, 638-639 (1982) (arguing for a “unitary
Executive” position disallowing executive officials to disclose information without the
President’s authority based on the Take Care Clause).
81 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.
DOC. NO. 103-6, 435 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello, eds., 1996) (“When President
Harrison died in 1841, Vice President Tyler, after initial hesitation, took the position that he was
automatically President, a precedent which has been followed subsequently and which is now
permanently settled by…the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.”).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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exercising this power, as the Supreme Court recognized in Eldred v Ashcroft83 upholding the
constitutionality of the Copyright Extension Act on the basis of “an unbroken congressional
practice of granting to authors of works and existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions.”84
Similarly, we may discount the Vice-President’s authority, which Al Gore, Jr.,undertook on his
last day in office to settle the 2000 presidential election, as “President of the Senate” to oversee
the final counting of electoral votes for the presidency, including opening “all the certificates” of
electoral votes cast.85 Thomas Jefferson effectively exercised this non-reviewable power to his
advantage in the aftermath of the closely contested presidential election of 1800.86
Many other powers are often overlooked though still significant. For instance, the
Constitution vests powers in each chamber of the Congress, such as empowering the House to
“chuse their Speaker and other Officers”87 and the Senate to “chuse their Officers”,88 pursuant to
which these chambers have chosen their leaders for more than two hundred years. Many other
powers are implicit, though frequently deployed. In the few instances in which the Court has
reviewed these powers, it has left political authorities’ decisions in tact. For instance, it did so
with respect to the President’s authorities to rescind treaties and to use military force without
83 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
84 Id. at 778.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
86 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL,
AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2006).
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
88 Id., art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
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congressional authorization,89 and the Congress’ authorities to abolish inferior courts and to
expand or contract the Court’s size.90
The sheer range of presidential and congressional powers says nothing about their
finality. Part II demonstrates the durability and finality of the overwhelming number of non-
judicial authorities’ constitutional judgments, even when subject to judicial review.
II.
The Finality of Non-Judicial Precedent
Finality is an overlooked feature of non-judicial precedent. To be sure, several notable
scholars proclaim ours an era of judicial supremacy,91 in which the Court supposedly substitutes
its constitutional judgment routinely for that of non-judicial actors. But, the record does not
support the charge. Judicial review of non-judicial constitutional activity is limited, and non-
judicial actors have the last word on a surprising range of constitutional law questions.
89 When President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan without Congressional approval, some
members of Congress filed a claim that his actions usurped their prerogative to approve changes
in the supreme law of the land. The Supreme Court ordered that the claim be vacated. Four
Justices based their decision on the political question doctrine, while Powell concurred on the
grounds that the claim was not yet ripe for judicial review because Congress had taken no action
to assert its constitutional authority. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); See also
SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 807 (Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, eds., 2d ed., 2005)
(“[T]he Executive has adhered to a constitutional view…that the President has unreviewable
authority (a) to determine when the interests of the United States demand U.S. military action
and (b) to commit our troops to the protection of U.S. interests, even without clear legislative
authority.”).
90 See Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 986-987.
91 See KRAMER, supra note 64, at 227 (suggesting that the Supreme Court circa 2003 “went too
far, seeking to control matters at the heart of contemporary politics…”); see generally Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: the Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 333 (1998).
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A. The Limited Scope of Judicial Review. Judicial review of the constitutional activity of
non-judicial actors is surprisingly limited. As anyone familiar with constitutional law knows, the
Supreme Court cannot reach out to decide every question of constitutional law, even those the
justices are eager to review.92 By design, the Supreme Court must wait for constitutional
questions to come to it. Indeed, the Court has never had jurisdiction to hear all possible
constitutional claims.93 Nor are all constitutional questions litigated. Of the constitutional
questions that are litigated, not all are appealed to the Supreme Court.94 Of those that are
appealed, the Court chooses not to hear them all. It has never agreed to decide the merits of
every constitutional question brought before it. Of the questions that the Court chooses to
decide, not all are constitutional cases, and most constitutional cases involve the constitutional
judgments of non-judicial authorities.95 Hence, virtually every question of constitutional law that
the Court hears has already been considered by one or more non-judicial actors. Thus, it is a
92 See ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 18
(1976) (noting the limitation that the courts may only decide constitutional issues as questions of
law “in the course of ordinary litigation”).
93 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320-323 (5th edition, 2003). See also Daniel Meltzer, The History
and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
94 For the 12-month period ending in March of 2004, 1,654,847 cases were filed in the
bankruptcy courts; 278,212 cases were filed in the U.S. District Courts; and 60,505 cases were
filed in the U.S Court of Appeals. See Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/contents.html. During the 2004 term, the Supreme Court
considered 1727 petitions from the appellate docket, granting certiorari to 69, and 5815 petitions
from the miscellaneous docket, granting certiorari to only 11. See The Supreme Court—The
2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426 (2005).
95 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, As a Private Lawyer, Miers Left Little for the Public Record,
N.Y. TIMES, October 10, 2005, at A17 (citing statistics that, of 80 cases before the Supreme
Court in the previous term, only 33 raised questions of constitutional law, and that such numbers
are typical).
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mistake to assume that judicial review makes the Court supreme or final in deciding
constitutional issues.
In fact, most constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors survive judicial review.96
First, the Supreme Court may not take any cases in which lower courts have already upheld the
constitutional judgments of non-judicial institutions. For a significant portion of its history, the
Court lacked the jurisdiction to review cases upholding federal laws or rights.97 Its jurisdiction
was limited to those overturning federal laws or impeding federal rights.
Second, the Supreme Court uses its most deferential review in most cases. Most judicial
review involves the application of the rational basis test, which is the most deferential standard
available for assessing the constitutionality of state action. 98 It is very rare for the Court to strike
down governmental action for violating the rational basis test.99
Third, the standing and political question doctrines have precluded judicial review of
several areas of constitutional law. Standing doctrine restricts who may litigate certain
96 For instance, during the 2004 term of the Supreme Court, three cases dealt with constitutional
judgments of the federal government outside the criminal context. Of these cases, at least two
were decided for the government. Likewise, thirteen cases dealt with the constitutional
judgments of state or local actors. Of these, nine were decided in favor of the government.
(Note, however, that this percentage shifts in the criminal context—of the three federal criminal
cases involving constitutional issues, all were decided against the government, while six of eight
state criminal cases involving constitutional issues were decided against the government.) See
The Supreme Court—The 2004 Term: The Statistics, supra note 94, at 428-430; see generally
LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH, & THOMAS WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM (3d edition, 2003).
97 HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 93, at 320-21.
98 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (deluxe 8th ed. 2004) (“Rational basis is the most
deferential of the standards of review that courts use…”).
99 For some notable exceptions, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 437 U.S. 432 (1985).
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constitutional claims in Article III courts.100 For instance, the Court decided on standing grounds
not to address the constitutionality of public schools’ daily recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance.101 By overturning on standing grounds a Ninth Circuit holding that the Pledge as
currently worded violated the First Amendment’s prohibition against establishment of
religion,102 the Court left in tact Congress’ decision made at the outset of the Cold War to revise
the Pledge of Allegiance to include the words “under God.”103 When a district court
subsequently ruled that Ninth Circuit precedent required overturning the Pledge on establishment
clause grounds, members of Congress wasted no time in denouncing the decision and ratifying
their earlier decision to include the words “under God” in the Pledge.104
Moreover, the Court in Allen v. Wright105 refused on standing grounds to adjudicate
claims that the Internal Revenue Service had not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to
fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The
Court stressed that political checks, rather than judicial review, provided the appropriate
100 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 58 (4th ed., 2003) (“The notion is that by
restricting who may sue in federal court, standing limits what matters the judiciary will address
and minimizes judicial review of the actions of the other branches of government.”); see also
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (arguing that standing “is a crucial and inseparable element of
[the separation of powers] principle, whose disregard will inevitably produce…an
overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance”).
101 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”).
103 See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, Ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
104 See 148 CONG. REC. S6100, 6101-04 (2002) (quoting various senators referring to the
decision as “twisted” (Sen. Lieberman), “nuts” (Sen. Daschle), and “stupid” (Sen. Reid)).
105 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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constraints on the Internal Revenue Service’s obligations regarding the tax-exempt status of
private schools. The Court deferred to the discretion of non-judicial authorities in resolving
questions about the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.
Through the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court has avoided reaching the
merits of constitutional questions involving the powers of non-judicial actors.106 The Court has
held non-justiciable judicial challenges to the process for ratifying constitutional amendments,107
using Senate trial committees to gather evidence and take testimony for judicial impeachment
trials,108 and enforcing the Republican guarantee clause.109
Fourth, the Court defers to non-judicial precedent in other forms. The Court accepts
precedent as tradition,110 historical practice,111 and custom.112 Though often loosely defined,
these terms are meant to refer to separate actions. Tradition refers to the States’ longstanding
106 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
107 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450.
108 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-230. The Court determined that the test of the Constitution in
various places, historical practices, and original understanding supported its treating judicial
challenges to Senate trial committees as non-justiciable. In another context, the Court examined
the constitutionality of a procedural rule under the rational basis test. See United States v. Ballin,
144 U.S. 1 (1892). Whether the Court refuses to consider the merits of constitutional challenges
to certain procedures altogether or uses the rational basis test for determining the
constitutionality of such procedures, the outcome is effectively the same – the Court lets the
Congress’ constitutional judgment stands.
109 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
110 Id. at 10-12.
111 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
112 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
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understandings or assumptions about the scope of personal autonomy in certain realms of
behavior or their powers to restrict, or proscribe, personal autonomy.113 Generally, historical
practices refer to the federal government’s repeated or longstanding exercises of powers within
particular realms.114 Indeed, the Court’s willingness to uphold congressional acts on the basis of
longstanding historical practice is not new. In Stuart v. Laird,115 the Court upheld Congress’
requiring Supreme Court justices to ride circuit in a stunning endorsement of non-judicial
precedent. Justice William Paterson explained for the unanimous Court “that practice and
acquiescence . . . for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
system, affords an irrestistible [sic] answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a
contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong
and obstinate to be shaken or controlled, and ought not now to be disturbed.”116 Custom refers to
either the habitual ways, or practices, of either localities or nations.117 Custom is a longstanding
113 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (referring to traditional rights to bodily
integrity and freedom from unwanted touching); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725
(1997) (referring to the “long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical
treatment”).
114 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (referring to the “historical
practice” of the Executive making postwar reparations settlements implicating private parties
within belligerent states); Norfolk & Western Ry. V. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 162-163 (2003)
(deferring to the historical practice of Federal Employers’ Liability Act courts allowing railroad
employers to be held jointly and severally liable); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204 (referring to Congress’
historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms to future and existing copyrights).
In Hudson v. Michigan, 2006 U.S. Lexis 4677 (June 15, 2006), the Court held the exclusionary
rule inapplicable in light of “changed circumstances” in police practices as a safeguard against
violations of the ancient “knock-and-announce” rule.
115 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
116 Id. at 308-309.
117 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 500 (2000) (referring to well-established customs
of Hawaiian people, including agriculture, fishing, and polytheism); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512
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source of international law.118 While the Supreme Court does not treat historical practices,
custom, or tradition as sacrosanct (or immune to judicial review), it routinely acknowledges its
respect for each of these categories and routinely upholds particular instances of each. It is rare
for the Court to overturn traditions, historical practices, or customs.119
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent allows the States to render final judgments on the
scope of their respective state sovereignty.120 Eleventh Amendment121 jurisprudence recognizes
that states may waive their sovereign immunity against being liable for damages in federal court
and that state law illuminates whether States have retained their sovereign immunity.122 The
Court also allows States to determine the scope of activities for which they may be held
accountable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action doctrine.123
U.S. 687, 700 (1994) (referring to customary practice in New York of consolidating school
districts); Weisman, 505 U.S. at 583 (referring to customary features of high school graduations).
118 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945)
(listing “international custom” as a traditional source of international law).
119 For two notable exceptions, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
120 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-669 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1
(1890); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
122 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 705, 724 (1999).
123 See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999) (holding that court will only find a waiver of immunity if the state voluntarily
invokes the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, or if it makes a “clear declaration” that it intends to
submit itself to Supreme Court jurisdiction); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)
(holding that a state’s sovereign immunity “is a personal privilege which it may waive at
pleasure”); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858) (holding that the decision for a state to
waive its immunity “is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty”).
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Fifth, preoccupation with judicial review sometimes blinds people to the Court’s
deference to non-judicial precedent. For instance, the stridency of the dissents about the
majority’s activism in two recent, seemingly unrelated cases has deflected attention from the fact
that common link between the cases was the Court’s deference to non-judicial authority. In both
cases, dissents charged the majorities with either abdicating their authority or engaging in
judicial activism; and in both cases, the majorities deferred to political authorities. In particular,
in Gonzales v. Raich,124 the Court concluded that federal law criminalizing possession and
distribution of marijuana pre-empted States from allowing doctors to authorize their patients to
use marijuana for medical purposes. While the dissent complained that the majority had failed to
give adequate respect to the States operating as laboratories,125 the majority accepted Congress’
formulation of a comprehensive national policy to regulate drugs. Similarly, in Kelo v. City of
New London,126 the majority upheld a locality’s decision to take private property in a relatively
poor neighborhood for the purpose of developing the land to benefit wealthier residents. The
dissent complained that the majority’s deference eviscerated the Takings Clause. Yet, the Court
in Kelo merely allowed the locality – a non-judicial authority – the final say on the scope of its
power. Kelo allows localities to reach different conclusions about the “public uses[s]” for which
they may exercise control over private property. 127 A locality could make a more restrictive
124 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
125 Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
126 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
127 Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence
and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 49 (2006) (“…the holding in
Kelo affirms the guarantee…of local government autonomy, not just in matters of development,
but also as in matters of property ownership in general.”).
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determination of what constitutes “public use” for purposes of eminent domain, and this
determination would be just as constitutional as the judgment of the City of New London (and
for the same reasons). Similarly, if the Congress were to make exceptions for medical
marijuana, this judgment would be just as constitutional as the judgment, upheld in Raich, to
disallow any such exceptions. A different Congress could make exceptions for medical
marijuana.
A similar deference to the constitutional choices of Congress was apparent in Eldred v.
Ashcroft.128 There, the Court upheld the Copyright Extension Act extending copyright terms to
the point at which they no longer seemed to be just for the “limited times” as proscribed by the
Constitution.129 Though harshly criticized by the nation’s pre-eminent expert on copyright law
and lawyer for the plaintiff in Eldred,130 Eldred is significant for leaving Congress with the final
say over the degree to which it will extend, or shorten, terms for copyright. Congress’ judgment
to extend such ownership repeatedly is just as constitutional as a different congressional
judgment to shorten such terms based on a entirely different construction of the relevant
constitutional authority. Nothing in the Constitution compels Congress to repeatedly extend
copyright terms, and nothing in the Constitution compels Congress to forego extending them.
The choice of extension belongs to the Congress, and the relevant precedent for Congress is its
longstanding recognition that the pertinent discretion belongs to it and to it alone.
128 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
130 See Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed., Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art’s Expense, N.Y. TIMES,
January 18, 2003, at A17.
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Sixth, there are many other areas that the Supreme Court has not subjected to judicial
review and is unlikely ever to do so. For instance, the federal impeachment process is rife with
final congressional judgments on constitutional questions, such as which kinds of misconduct
qualify as the lawful grounds for removal from office and whether censure is constitutional.131
Similarly, presidents and senators make the final, constitutional judgments on the criteria for
assessing judicial, cabinet, and sub-cabinet nominations.132 Other areas of effectively final, non-
reviewable decision-making are presidential transitions,133 the powers of congressional
committees and their respective jurisdictions,134 rule-making within the House and the Senate,135
and reorganizing the federal government (as occurred recently with the creation of the
131 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORY ANALYSIS passim (2d edition, 2000) (discussing these and other
constitutional issues arising in impeachment proceedings).
132 See Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is Denied Its
Right to Consent: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement
of Douglas Kmiec) (“The original understanding gives unfettered nomination authority to the
President…”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional
Interpretation, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 110 (Neal Devins & Keith Whittington,
eds., 2005) (discussing the ways in which the Senate effects unreviewable constitutional
interpretation through its authority over federal appointments). See also David A. Strauss &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L. J.
1491 (1992) (criticizing the deference of the Senate to the President’s choice of nominees).
133 See generally Jack M. Beerman & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of
Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2006).
134 See generally Keith E. Whittington, Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional
Committees, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 132, at 87 (suggesting that
committees engage constitutional issues as evidenced through their hearings).
135 Each chamber’s rule-making is effectively final for two reasons. First, courts have deferred
to these rules. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). Second, courts have dismissed
judicial challenges to each chamber’s procedural rules on standing and political question
grounds. See Skaggs v. Carlyle, 110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Nixon v. United States, 938
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hoffman v. Jeffords, 175 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2001); Page v.
Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1998).
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Department of Homeland Security, which overtook the responsibility of coordinating a number
of offices and agencies that had been located in other federal departments136). Presidential
decisions on vetoes and pardons are invariably final.137
Even when the Court has employed heightened scrutiny, it has not always been fatal.138
The Court reviewed the constitutionality of the University of Michigan’s law school admissions
program under strict scrutiny, but upheld it nevertheless.139 It adopted Justice Lewis Powel’s
approach in his pivotal concurrence in Bakke v. California Regents140 to uphold for the first time
a racial preference for professional schools. The Court subjected the Bi-Partisan Campaign
Finance Reform Bill141 and Family Leave Act142 to heightened scrutiny, but upheld both laws.
The Court rarely overturns the constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors. Indeed, it
has overturned less than 190 federal laws,143 and the Roberts Court did not overturn a single
136 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
137 See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (“Presidents throughout our history as a
Nation have exercised the power to pardon or commute sentences upon conditions that are not
specifically authorized by statute [and] such conditions have generally gone unchallenged.”).
138 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (declaring that “we wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”) (citation omitted).
139 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
140 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
141 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Bill).
142 See Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Family Leave Act).
143 Through the 2002 Term, the Supreme Court had struck down only 169 federal laws as
unconstitutional. Of those, 13 were struck down during the 1930s, while as of 2003, 41 were
struck down under the Rehnquist Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Because We Are Final: Judicial
Review Two Hundred Years After Marbury, 56 SMU L. REV. 781, 786 (2003). For a table
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federal law in its first Term. This rate of overturning averages less than one federal law per year.
Even though the Rehnquist Court overturned over 40 federal laws,144 those numbers are
misleading. While the Rehnquist Court overturned more federal laws than all prior Courts had,
they constitute a tiny fraction of the thousands of federal laws enacted during the same period.145
During its nearly 19-year lifespan, the Rehnquist Court struck down a tiny fraction of the
constitutional activities of actors besides Congress. For instance, the Rehnquist Court struck
down only a small number of States’ constitutional judgments in its last few years.146 The Court
overturns presidential judgments more rarely than it does congressional actions. Over the past
half century, the Court has overturned less than a dozen presidential acts, most of which involved
providing the number of federal and state laws struck down by decade, see HAROLD W. STANLEY
& RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2003-2004 292 (2003); see also
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 163-66.
144 See Neal Devins, Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: The Majoritarian Rehnquist
Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (2004) (discussing, inter alia, the significance of the
numbers of federal laws overturned by the Rehnquist Court).
145 From 1986 through April 30, 2006, the Senate passed 11,642 total measures, while the house
passed 13,257, for a grand total of 24,899. For instance, in 2004, the Senate passed 663 of 1318
measures introduced, while the House passed 747 of 2338 measures introduced. In 1997, the
Senate passed 385 of 1840 measures introduced, while the House passed 544 of 3728 measures
introduced. See cumulative résumés, posted in the back of the CONG. REC. for the first edition of
each month. Yearly résumés available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_
column_table/Resumes.htm.
146 From 1980-1989, the Supreme Court struck down 169 state or local laws; from 1990-1999,
however, this number dipped to 61. From 2000-2002, the Court had only struck down 9 state or
local laws, fewer than then number of federal laws struck down in the same period (11). See
STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 143, at 163-166. While not all of these laws were necessarily
struck down on constitutional grounds, a look at the 2004 term may be illustrative. Of the
thirteen cases involving the constitutional judgments of state or local actors, only nine were
struck down. See The Supreme Court—the 2004 Term, supra note 94, at 429; see also SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM supra note 96, at 193.
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presidential efforts to thwart judicial inquiries into their conduct.147 To be sure, the Court
overturned the constitutional judgments of executive officials, including President Bush, in three
cases – each involving the constitutional foundations for President Bush’s restrictions on access
to courts by people detained in the military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.148 Yet, its
compliance with the Court’s rulings remains unclear.149 The few other cases in which the Court
has overturned presidents’ actions involved presidential usurpations of legislative authority.150
B. The Significance of the Timing of Judicial Review. The timing of judicial review has
significant ramifications for non-judicial precedent. The longer it takes for the Court to review
the constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors, the longer those judgments endure. For
instance, the Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act as a curb on the power of President
Andrew Johnson to remove Republicans from his cabinet,151 but the Supreme Court did not
review its constitutionality until almost six decades later.152 In the meantime, 12 presidents had
147 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
148 See Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfield v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
149 See Jerry Markon, U.S. to Free Hamdi, Send Him Home, WASH. POST, Sep. 23, 2004, at
A01.
150 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). A close reading of Youngstown indicates that every justice
would have upheld a congressional delegation of authority to the President to seize control of the
nation’s steal mills under certain circumstances. A close reading of Clinton v. City of New York
suggests little or no practical option, as the Constitution currently stands, for presidents to
exercise what are in effect vetoes of portions of enactments. While a constitutional amendment
is needed to provide the President with line-item veto authority, a number of states have
constitutionally authorized their governors to exercise line-item vetoes.
151 See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 46-47
(1973).
152 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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to accommodate their differing opinions about its constitutionality. The most famous conflict
was the first. After President Andrew Johnson refused to comply with the act’s requirement to
get congressional approval before removing a cabinet official whose nomination the Senate had
approved, the House impeached and the Senate nearly convicted him.153 Senators’
contemplating other presidents’ misconduct must clarify the meaning of Johnson’s acquittal.154
The significance of the ramifications of belated judicial review is evident with respect to
the ways in which the moral and ethical dilemmas raised by advancements in medical technology
– known as bioethics – are handled prior to their relatively rare disposition by the Supreme
Court. For instance, Oregon’s assisted suicide law had been in effect for a number of years prior
to a challenge to its constitutionality came before the Supreme Court.155 The Court did not
render a judgment on the constitutionality of this law until 2005, more than a decade after the
state had enacted the legislation.156 Since no court had barred implementation of the statute in
the meantime, almost 200 people had chosen to die pursuant to the act’s procedures. The law
was final for these people, their health care providers, and their families.
Courts may never resolve many other hotly contested bioethical issues. These issues are
largely governed by a combination of diverse sources of law, of which judicial decisions
comprise only a small part. Bioethical issues largely turn on relevant portions of federal statutes
(enacted pursuant to Congress’ Commerce and Spending Clause powers), federal regulations,
153 See generally M. BENEDICT, supra note 151, passim.
154 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S1462 at 1465 (1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (using
Johnson’s acquittal to establish a framework for addressing the Clinton impeachment).
155 The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat §§ 127.800-897 (2003).
156 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2005).
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professional standards and licensing, state statutes and regulations, and hospital policies, codes
of ethics, and protocols.157 The courts generally have not addressed whether states may prohibit
reproductive cloning or genetic screening for determining the gender or other characteristics of
children whose conception may be facilitated through artificial technologies.158 The population
of increasingly older Americans may raise issues ranging from government financing of gene
therapies to the legalization of pain-killing drugs.159 While the Court upheld Congress’ authority
to fashion a comprehensive national drug policy,160 lobbying may increase to expand the
opportunities for using marijuana or other currently prohibited drugs for medical purposes.161
President Bush’s threatened veto of proposed legislation to expand the use of embryonic stem
cells for medical research was the last move in an ongoing, expanding conflict over legally
defining life and its constitutional protections.162 Questions about using medical technology to
extend life and ease pain are still largely left to non-judicial authorities.
C. The Relevance of Non-Judicial Precedent in Constitution Crises. National political
leaders, rather than courts, have made the critical decisions to resolve the three different kinds of
crises arising in our legal system – political, judicial, and constitutional.
157 See generally JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW (2005).
158 See, e.g., Sheils v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., No. 97-5510, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 23, 1998) (dismissing a claim challenging Pennsylvania’s prohibition on reproductive
cloning on the grounds that the alleged harm was too speculative since cloning was not yet
possible).
159 See Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts v. The Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
160 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
161 See Rosen, supra note 159, at § V, ¶ 3.
162 See Sheryl G. Stolberg, In Rare Threat, Bush Vows Veto of Stem Cell Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2005, at A1.
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A political crisis arises when national political leaders dispute each other’s constitutional
authority. A classic example is the House’s impeachment and the Senate’s near conviction of
President Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure in Office Act. The rules employed by the
Senate for Johnson’s trial163 and Johnson’s acquittal have served as important precedents guiding
the Senate subsequently in handling presidential misconduct. The Senate followed the same
rules in President Clinton’s impeachment trial,164 and affirmed Johnson’s acquittal as a precedent
for not treating a president’s policy disagreements with Congress as grounds for removal.165
A second kind of crisis is judicial, which arises when state or national political authorities
challenge, or refuse to follow, a constitutional directive of the Supreme Court. In the modern
era, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education166 triggered a judicial crisis.
Southern political leaders proclaimed Brown illegitimate and refused to abide by it. They
endorsed the Southern Manifesto, which proclaimed that the Constitution allowed the States
through the concept of interdiction to refuse to comply with any federal directive that they
considered unconstitutional. The precedent for interdiction was John Calhoun’s repeated
reliance on it as a basis for State resistance to federal policies or mandates whose
constitutionality they questioned. Eventually, segregation ended, but only with the pivotal help
163 Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the Senate (rev. ed.), 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., S. DOC. NO. 93-33, 2-8 (1986).
164 See Editorial, Keep Trial Fully Open, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at B6 (noting that the
Senate is relying on rules adopted in 1868 for Clinton’s impeachment).
165 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIALS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
166 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of national political leaders.167 Subsequently, Brown has come to stand as an abject lesson in the
judiciary’s need for strong political support to support its politically salient decisions.168
A constitutional crisis is a rare event when political authorities recognize that the
Constitution does not provide the means for resolving a fundamental dispute among them. We
have had a few such crises in American history, but the most famous constitutional crisis is
secession. The Supreme Court helped to set the stage for this crisis with its decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.169 Dred Scott exacerbated ongoing friction among national political leaders,
which culminated in secession. Neither side conceded that the Constitution provided a
mechanism for peacefully resolving their differences. Thus, Dred Scott precipitated a judicial
crisis, or the peculiar circumstance in which political authorities to refuse to accept or be bound
by a judicial ruling with whose lawfulness they disagreed. Courts could do nothing to solve the
judicial crisis that Dred Scott precipitated or to prevent its evolving into a constitutional crisis.
Courts had no power to stop secession as the final, formal break between Northern and Southern
states in an ongoing dispute over state autonomy in protecting slavery from federal intervention
and regulation. War settled the constitutional conflict over secession.
The Court has yet to resolve a genuine constitutional crisis. It lacks the means to resolve
political crises, and national political leaders have been instrumental in resolving judicial crises.
167 See KLARMAN, supra note 65, at 389-408.
168 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 244-257 (2d ed., 1986).
169 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
42
On the few occasions when courts have triggered crises, political branches have resolved
them.170 Courts have not settled any judicial crises.
By their nature, constitutional crises are not amenable to judicial resolution. They require
constitutional change. For instance, when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied in the Electoral
College after the 1800 presidential election, the matter was referred to the House of
Representatives. 171 The outcome was not obvious in the House, even though Burr had run as
Jefferson’s Vice-President. After the House declared Jefferson the winner, the Twelfth
Amendment was drafted and ratified to preclude similar controversies from arising in the
future.172 The solution was political, not judicial. The 1800 election and its aftermath served as
a precedent for the next election dispute. When no one won the 1820 presidential election
outright, a political crisis ensued, and the House settled the matter after Henry Clay threw his
support to John Quincy Adams rather than Andrew Jackson, whom he disliked.173
In 1876, the House decided not to follow its precedent. When neither of the major
candidates in the 1876 presidential election had a majority in the Electoral College, the House
referred the matter to a special commission.174 Both candidates agreed, so both were bound by
the commission’s decision. Democratic leaders in Congress never judicially challenged the
170 See BICKEL, supra note 168, at 252 (“In an enforcement crisis of any real proportions, the
judiciary is wholly dependent upon the Executive.”).
171 For a detailed analysis of the constitutional significance of this contest and its aftermath, see
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2006).
172 See U.S. CONST. amend XII.
173 See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 255-57 (2005).
174 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF
1876 (2004).
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outcome. Many saw a political advantage in continuing to question the legitimacy of the
decision and Hayes’ presidency over the next four years. They chose the political process as the
forum for working out their differences over the outcome of the election, and this has been the
model for resolving subsequent disputes in presidential elections. Even though the Court in
Bush v. Gore175 ended the legal battles following the 2000 presidential election, Democrats
chose not to contest the outcome.176 The resolutions of political crises have depended on the
willingness of non-judicial actors to reach accommodations through pre-existing constitutional
mechanisms. Each accommodation is a precedent for resolving crises.
III.
The Horizontal and Vertical Influence of Non-Judicial Precedent
Non-judicial precedent may exert influence in several ways. It may do so vertically,
which entails the imposition of a superior official’s constitutional judgments from the top-down
upon inferior authorities. A non-judicial precedent applies horizontally if it only has persuasive,
not binding, authority on other officials; it operates suggestively across or within particular
branches or institutions. Non-judicial precedent may be configured differently, depending on
timing, subject matter, direction, and the institutions and powers involved.
A. Vertical-Vertical Non-Judicial Precedent. The first kind of non-judicial precedent
operates vertically within the institution creating it and vertically on other institutions.
Presidential pardons are examples of vertical-vertical non-judicial precedent. The President has
175 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
176 See Don Van Natta Jr., Gore Lawyers Focus on Ballot in Palm Beach County, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2000, at A29 (quoting Gore lawyers as emphasizing that a legal challenge was an
option of the “last resort”).
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the unique power to pardon people for federal crimes.177 Once pardons are issued, they are
binding on other authorities. No other constitutional authority may undo, or undermine, a
presidential pardon. Not even a subsequent president may withdraw a predecessor’s pardon.
Pardons bind every branch at the top as well as every inferior federal and state official.
President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon illustrates the binding effect of a presidential
pardon. 178 The Congress lacks the authority to erase the pardon through legislation.179 The most
that the Congress may have been able to do was to hold hearings to inquire into the reasons for
President Ford’s pardoning Nixon.180 Moreover, President Carter, who followed President Ford
in office, had no power to erase Ford’s pardon of Nixon. In addition, state and federal courts had
to accept the pardon on its own terms; it barred any prosecutor from prosecuting Nixon for the
misconduct for which he had been pardoned.181 Federal or state prosecutors may not prosecute
people for the criminal misconduct for which they have been formally pardoned.
177 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
178 Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32601 (Sept. 8, 1974).
179 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (overturning a congressional enactment aimed at
limiting the effects of presidential pardons); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867) (holding,
among other things, that the President’s pardon power is “not subject to legislation” that
“Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of
offenders. …It was competent for the President to annex to his offer of pardon any conditions or
qualifications he should see fit…”).
180 Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. On
Criminal Justice, 94th cong. (1975).
181 Id. Nor, for that matter, did the courts have the power to adjudicate its merits. The only
person with standing to challenge Nixon’s pardon would probably have been Nixon, but he of
course had no reason to challenge the pardon. It is quite likely the Court would have dismissed
any challenge to the pardon power as non-justiciable.
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The most troublesome constitutional question raised about the pardon power is whether a
president may pardon himself. While there are credible arguments to be made for and against
such pardons,182 no court will ever likely address them. The ways in which presidents may
exercise their pardon power has been left to presidents to work out over time.183 Their
constitutional judgments have been formed based on their respective balancing of different
sources of constitutional argumentation, including historical practices.184
A second example of a vertical-vertical non-judicial precedent is a conviction of an
impeached official for misconduct by more than two-thirds of the Senate. Once more than two-
thirds of the Senate convicts a public official in an impeachment trial, that official is
automatically removed from office.185 No appeal, to any authority, is possible.186 Every other
authority must honor the removal. If, for instance, the President were the convicted official, no
other authority in our system of government may overrule the conviction and his removal from
182 See Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons,
106 YALE L.J. 779, 792-93 (1996).
183 See generally Presidential Pardon Power: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Daniel T. Kobil, Professor
of Law at Capital University Law School in Columbus, Ohio).
184 Id.
185 See GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 78 (noting that the Senate treats removal as the automatic
consequences of a two-thirds vote to convict).
186 Legal scholars disagree about the propriety of judicial review of a conviction in a Senate
impeachment trial. Most believe that it is not. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 118-123;
CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 53-64 (1974); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on
the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J. 707, 728 (1987-1988).
Many scholars believe that considerations such as the need for finality preclude a court’s ever
second-guessing the outcome of an impeachment trial. A few other scholars believe judicial
review of impeachment trials is permissible though it might be so deferential as to discourage
filing a lawsuit. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-121
(1973); IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 183-187 (1972).
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office. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly provides that the pardon power is inapplicable to
impeachments and removals.187 The finality of a Senate’s judgment to convict an impeached
official may not be undone.
A conviction in a Senate impeachment trial has limited binding effects. The Constitution
provides that “the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”188 If the Senate were to decide not to disqualify a
convicted official, the person remains constitutionally eligible to serve in another federal or state
office.189 For instance, the Senate convicted Alcee Hastings for bribery and removed him from a
federal district judgeship, but it did not vote to disqualify him from serving in other federal
offices. Hence, he was eligible to serve in another federal office.190 Not long after his removal,
Hastings ran successfully for a seat in the House, where he currently serves.191
B. Vertical-Horizontal Non-Judicial Precedent. A second kind of non-judicial precedent
is vertical-horizontal, which applies from the top-down within the institution producing it but
operates as persuasive authority across other institutions. A prime example of a vertical-
horizontal non-judicial precedent is a procedural rule in the House or the Senate. Each
chamber’s procedural rules govern the internal proceedings within each chamber, even those
187 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
189 See GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 77-79 (examining the sanctions the Senate may impose
upon conviction for impeachment).
190 See Clifford Krauss, Bedfellows for a Day: Politeness and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993,
at A16 (discussing Hasting’s conviction in impeachment hearings and subsequent election to the
House).
191 Kenneth J. Cooper, Hastings Joins His Former Accusers: Ousted Judge Takes Seat Among
Those Who Impeached Him, THE WASH. POST, January 6, 1993, at A10.
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relating to their amendment.192 But, each chamber’s procedural rules are not binding externally
– they do not bind outside each chamber’s respective domain. House rules do not bind how the
Senate operates. Nor do Senate rules bind the House. Nor, for that matter, do the rules of either
chamber bind the federal judiciary or the executive branch. A president, for instance, has no
formal powers to direct the House and Senate on which procedural rules they may adopt or
employ, though he is free to offer – or to refrain from offering – his independent judgment about
the constitutionality of each chamber’s procedural rules. None of the President’s
recommendations are binding on, or authoritative within, either the House or the Senate. In
practice, courts have generally refrained from second-guessing each chamber’s procedural
rules,193 and the Court’s ruling that the Constitution does not allow legislative standing – through
which some members of Congress might challenge a legislative action undertaken by the
Congress194 – makes it practically impossible for judicial challenges to be made against the
internal rules of either the House or the Senate.
C. Horizontal-Horizontal Non-Judicial Precedent. A third kind of non-judicial
precedents operates as persuasive authority within the institution creating it and across other
institutions. This kind of non-judicial precedent includes most things that are commonly lumped
together as traditions, customs, and historical practices. Historical precedents for preventive war
are examples of non-judicial precedent. While there are almost 200 instances of presidents
192 See Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political
Question Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1990) (declaring that “the entire legislative
process is subject to” the rules created by the two legislative chambers).
193 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
194 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
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overseeing military absent direct congressional authorization,195 none binds presidents or
members of Congress in deciding whether to initiate, or not to initiate, a particular military
action.196 They are relevant only to the extent that national political leaders find that they are
persuasive authority for exercising power in certain ways.
A second example of a horizontal-horizontal non-judicial precedent is the longstanding
practice within the Congress to open its sessions with a prayer. The Court upheld this practice
because of its longevity and its inconsequential effect on business within the Congress,197 but the
House, or the Senate, could each choose to end the practice without offending the Constitution.
Another example of a horizontal-horizontal non-judicial precedent consists of presidents’
choices of how (if not when) to comply with their constitutional obligation to report on the State
of the Union.198 President Jefferson chose to submit a letter to the Congress at the outset of each
congressional session. 199 President Wilson decided, however, to appear in person before a joint
session of Congress. 200 Subsequent presidents have followed Wilson’s example.
The State of the Union put the Senate in a difficult position in the midst of President
Clinton’s impeachment trial. His defense began its arguments in his Senate trial on the same day
195 See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology
Matters, 106 YALE L. J. 845, 877 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER
(1995)).
196 See Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1383-88 (discussing various arguments that may be employed
against precedents that suggest that the President possesses the sole power to enter into armed
conflicts absent congressional authorization).
197 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-795 (1983).
198 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
199 See BRANDS, supra note 39, at 30.
200 Id. at 30-31.
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on which he was scheduled to deliver his State of Union address.201 Senate leaders were
uncertain how to proceed, because allowing the President to proceed as scheduled enabled him to
take center stage in spite of his being on trial. Rescheduling or canceling the appearance might
have allowed the Senate to preserve an institutional advantage, but it would have been an
advantage attained at too high a cost, for it would have appeared to have been driven by partisan,
rather than constitutional, preferences. The President would not have agreed to any rescheduling
and would have balked at a cancellation, so rescheduling or canceling the address would have
provoked an additional conflict between the branches for which congressional leaders were not
prepared to take the responsibility. The Republican majority decided to adjourn early to allow
the President to give his address.202 It was a choice dictated not by the Constitution or the
binding force of precedent but rather because of the political exigencies of the moment as
calculated at the time by the Republican majority in the Senate.
Horizontal-horizontal non-judicial precedents came into play after Chief Justice William
Rehnquist’s death. President Bush had to decide initially whether he would follow the norm of
not naming a sitting justice as Chief Justice of the United States.203 Presidents usually appoint
someone from outside the Court as Chief Justice, in part to avoid friction among sitting justices
who might have wanted the job or were opposed to one of their colleagues from becoming Chief
Justice. President Bush chose to follow the norm. Timing was another issue: President Bush
had to decide whether to fill two vacancies on the Court at the same time or, instead, nominate a
201 See Editorial, State of the Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at A18.
202 145 CONG. REC. S495 (1999) (statement of Sen. Lott).
203 See Patty Reinert, William Rehnquist: 1924-2005, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sep. 4, 2005, at A6
(“Bush can nominate a sitting justice as chief and pick someone else to round out the nine-
member court, or nominate someone not currently on the court as chief.”).
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successor to the Chief Justice and forego naming someone to replace Justice O’Connor until after
the Senate had confirmed Rehnquist’s successor.204 The circumstance was unprecedented –
never before had a chief justice died pending hearings on a nomination to replace another justice,
and never before had a president had the opportunity to withdraw a nomination so that he could
re-nominate the person to the Chief Justiceship.205 President Bush made precedent with his
nomination of Roberts to two different seats on the Court within the span of a few months.
D. Limited Horizontal and Vertical Effects. A fourth kind of non-judicial precedent has
limited horizontal and vertical effects within the institutions producing them and on other
authorities. This is the largest category of non-judicial precedents. A wide range of non-judicial
activity fits within this category, including the judgments of the House in impeachment
proceedings, 206 presidential and gubernatorial executive orders, and impeachment or removal
trials in the state assemblies. Other institutions are bound by the outcomes of these activities
(i.e., other institutions cannot undo these decisions and must follow them to the extent they are
relevant to the functioning of those institutions), but none of the outcomes formally preclude the
institutions creating them from subsequently reaching different constitutional judgments on
similar or even identical issues. The outcomes constitute persuasive authority within an
204 See Julie Hirschfield Davis, Bush to Nominate Rehnquist’s Successor on Court ‘Promptly’;
President Must Choose Nominee, Chief Justice; Transition in the Supreme Court, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 5, 2005, at 1A.
205 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 131, passim.
206 Impeachment decisions by the House affect the House and Senate differently. Once the
House impeaches someone, its decision has been regarded (within both the House and the
Senate) as binding the Senate to take some action in response. But, the House’s decision to
impeach a particular official does not constitute anything more than persuasive (or instructive)
authority on how the House ought to exercise its impeachment authority. See Id., at 33-35
(describing how the Senate responds to impeachment judgments by the House).
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institution on how it ought to wield the same authority in a similar circumstance in the future.
For instance, a president’s executive order functions horizontally with respect to the president
who has issued the order and his successors.207 The order operates vertically on every executive
branch official other than the President, who may overturn, or modify, his or other presidents’
executive orders.208
Senatorial courtesy is a classic example of a non-judicial precedent with limited
horizontal and vertical effects.209 Senatorial courtesy entails the longstanding practice of
presidents’ deferring to the recommendations for nominations made by senators from his party to
federal offices in their respective states. Presidents are not bound by these recommendations and
thus by senatorial courtesy. They can ignore the recommendations, and thus they appear to be
merely horizontal. But refusals to abide by senatorial courtesy are usually not cost-free.
Senators generally support senatorial courtesy for the simple reason that it benefits them
whenever a president from their party is in office. They will often then support it, regardless of
the merits or quality of the recommendations some senator(s) have urged upon the President.
Yet, the fact that costs are frequently exacted for presidential refusals to abide by senatorial
courtesy does not transform this norm into a binding precedent for either the President or the
207 See 16A AM JUR 2d Constitutional Law § 252 (2004) (stating that “by promulgating rules
and regulations, the President may ‘legislate’ …[which] has the force and effect of law unless
overturned by the Courts or Congress”); see also L. Harold Levinson, Presidential Self-
Regulation Through Rulemaking: Comparative Comments on Structuring the Chief Executive’s
Constitutional Powers, Part I, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 695, 697-98 (1976) (suggesting that
President Ford’s 1974 pardon of Richard Nixon conflicted with a 1962 Executive Order by
President Kennedy).
208 See, e.g., Executive Order 12183 (December 1, 1979) (revoking President Johnson’s
executive orders 11322 and 11419 pertaining to trade sanctions on Zimbawe).
209 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 34, at 29-34 (tracing the history of senatorial courtesy).
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Senate. The reason is that senatorial courtesy is not an inflexible rule; it can be waived, or can
become a bargaining chip in negotiations between presidents and senators over judicial
appointments. Senatorial courtesy has persuasive authority, precisely because it helps to
persuade or convince presidents in making, or not making, judicial nominations.
Presidential signing statements and official opinions from the Attorney General constitute
two other examples of limited horizontal-vertical non-judicial precedent. President Bush, for
instance, has executed almost 800 signing statements, which clarify the extent to which he feels
bound by any laws he approves. 210 The Office of Legal Counsel produces official opinions for
the Attorney General in response to requests from her, other executive branch officials or
authorities, and the President.211 These opinions generally have binding authority throughout the
executive branch; everyone within the executive branch is bound to follow the opinion. Yet,
OLC opinions are not binding on a differently composed Office of Legal Counsel. Nor do these
opinions or presidential signing statements bind subsequent presidents, who are free to reject
them as they please. Indeed, President Bush exercised this discretion when he openly rejected
the counsel expressed in several OLC opinions on whether the President was bound to follow
certain international laws or agreements barring the torture of prisoners of war.212 Even then, he
felt the need to explain his deviation from the usual path of presidents’ following OLC
210 See Savage, supra note 7, at ¶ 1 (“President Bush has quietly claimed the authority to
disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, asserting that he has the power to set
aside any statute passed by Congress when it conflicts with his interpretation of the
Constitution.”).
211 See Kmiec, supra note 38, at 337.
212 R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at A12.
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opinions.213 He had to explain himself just as other people do when they feel pressure to explain
why they have changed their minds. While OLC opinions and presidential signing statements
have limited vertical effects within the executive branch, neither has any binding effect on
officials in other branches. Outside the executive branch, OLC opinions and presidential signing
statements constitute persuasive authority.
Another excellent example of a non-judicial precedent with limited vertical and
horizontal effects is the Judiciary Committee’s failure to approve a judicial nomination. If the
Judiciary Committee were to fail to act by the end of the session in which the nomination was
made, Senate Rule XXXI directs that the nomination will have lapsed.214 The President must
respect that judgment; he has no power to undo it. But, he can re-nominate the same individual.
Nor does the decision to disapprove a judicial nomination bind the Judiciary Committee
subsequently. It may refuse to act on a nomination more than once or may decide later to
confirm the nominee. Subsequent committees are not bound to follow the Committee’s prior
judgments.215 For example, in 1992, the Judiciary Committee failed to act on President George
213 See Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed; Justice
Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, THE WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A01.
214 S. DOC. NO. 106-1, R. XXXI § 6 at 6 (2003).
215 The full Senate’s consideration of a nomination also qualifies as a limited horizontal-vertical
non-judicial precedent. Even if the Senate were to reject a nominee to a particular office, it
could reconsider and approve the same nominee for the same position. Of course, the timing
makes a difference. A differently composed Senate could approve a nominee for the same or a
different post. For instance, the Senate rejected President Jackson’s nominations of Roger Taney
as Treasury Secretary and as Associate Justice but later confirmed Taney as Chief Justice of the
United States. In a subsequent contest of wills with the Senate, President Tyler nominated Caleb
Cushing three times to be Secretary of the Treasury, and the Senate rejected, by increasing
margins, the nomination each time. Though with no different result, President Coolidge re-
nominated Charles Warren as Attorney General immediately after the Senate had formally
rejected his nomination. John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need
for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, n.19 (2003).
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H.W. Bush’s nomination of John Roberts to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 216 Nine years later, President George W. Bush re-nominated Roberts to the same
court, but the then-Democratically led Senate Judiciary Committee took no action on the
nomination.217 After the 2002 mid-term elections, Republicans took control of the committee,
Bush re-nominated Roberts, and the Committee approved the nomination. The Senate
subsequently confirmed his appointment by a unanimous voice vote.218 Upon first nominating
Roberts to replace Justice O’Connor, President Bush pointed to the latter as a reason to expect
that the nomination would receive bipartisan support.219 After the Senate confirmed Roberts as
Chief Justice, his confirmation became a precedent for the kind of nomination Bush had to make
to avoid a divisive, protracted battle in the Senate.
Similarly, House impeachments have limited vertical effects. As a practical matter, the
failure to impeach means that the targeted official is not subject to any further congressional
proceedings in the same congressional session for the same misconduct, while a formal
impeachment by the House imposes an obligation on the Senate to take some formal action in
response. Yet, the House may still consider impeaching a person on a different basis than that
for which the House previously impeached the person or failed to impeach him. There is no
216 See Neil A. Lewis, Waiting for Clinton, Democrats Hold up Court Confirmations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 1, 1992, at A1.
217 See Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, August 11, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at
38.
218 Karen Masterson, Bush to Note the 2nd Anniversary of Owen’s nomination, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 9, 2003, at A8.
219 See Todd S. Purdum, Bush Picks Nominee for Court; Cites His ‘Fairness and Civility’, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A1.
55
constitutional principle barring the House from impeaching someone for misconduct that is the
same as that for which it did not impeach him or others.220 This is what happened to President
Andrew Johnson: Though the House had failed twice to impeach Johnson for obstructing
Congress, it impeached him for violating the Tenure in Office Act.221 Choices about whether or
not to impeach are persuasive authority within the House on what it may do next. The same is
true for Senate impeachment trials: Prior acquittals do not preclude the Senate from subjecting
the same person for different misconduct or different people for similar misconduct as that for
which it has previously acquitted others.
Other examples of limited-vertical and –horizontal effects precedents involve executive
and legislative privileges. Presidential decisions on what material to keep confidential bind every
other official in the executive branch, while the House or Senate set the rules governing what its
members may keep confidential. 222 Presidents’ decisions on executive privilege do not bind
subsequent presidents because executive privilege belongs to the office and not to a particular
occupant. Nor do presidents’ claims of executive privilege bind Congress. At most, they are
persuasive authority. Similarly, congressional assertions of privilege against executive action do
not bind subsequent congresses or presidents. These assertions are persuasive authority. Hence,
most claims of executive or legislative privilege are resolved through mutual accommodations
220 See GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 103-11 (discussing the elusive and case-by-case nature of
the scope of impeachable offenses).
221 ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT
TRIALS 134-137 (1992).
222 See, e.g., New Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 210 (2002) (noting that
the Senate currently limits public access to Senate records, and retains the discretion to extend
that access period for its own records); see also H.R. Rule XI(2)(k)(7): “No evidence or
testimony taken in executive session may be released or used in public sessions without the
consent of the committee.”
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reached between presidents and the Congress. Moreover, neither presidents’ nor legislators’
claims of privilege do not bind the courts. The Supreme Court declared, for instance, in United
States v. Nixon223 that presidents are entitled to qualified executive privileges. The latter require
courts to balance competing considerations.224 Similarly, the Court has not been constrained by
congressional understandings in interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause. 225 The Court treats
each branch’s understanding of its respective privileges as persuasive authority.
IV.
The Limited Path Dependency of Non-Judicial Precedent
Determining the directional and temporal influence of a non-judicial precedent does not
fully illuminate its role in constitutional law. Even acknowledging that a precedent is supposed
to be binding authority does not clarify the practical extent to which it imposes path dependency
– subsequently foreclosing or constraining certain choices. Non-judicial precedent shares with
judicial precedent the characteristic of generating limited path dependency, by which I mean that
it rarely forecloses or mandates specific choices.226 Some scholars may point out that the
apparent lack of path dependency undermines the claim of judicial precedent to the status of law,
223 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
224 Id. at 708-709.
225 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123-133 (1979) (holding the Speech or
Debate Clause does not protect the publication of libelous remarks); see also Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973) (cautioning that the Speech or Debate Clause has not been extended beyond
the legislative sphere); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (holding that the
American speech or debate privilege only protects legislative independence, but does not
connote legislative supremacy).
226 See generally Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 905 (defining path dependency).
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(if it were law, it would constrain justices’ discretion more robustly). 227 Yet, these scholars
would be mistaken in assuming that any kind of precedent – judicial or otherwise – has to have
relatively strong path dependency to attain the status of law. As I have argued elsewhere,
precedents are not designed to impose much path dependency, 228 while they perform many other
functions.
A. Beyond Standards and Rules. While judicial precedents are generally framed as rules
or standards,229 the same cannot be said of non-judicial precedent. Non-judicial precedent may
arise from a myriad of circumstances and thus can take multiple forms. They may be expressed
in various ways and through various means, and non-judicial authorities rarely explain in detail
the reasons for their actions or inaction.230 In many instances, non-judicial precedents are the
outcomes of an institutional decision-making process or conflict. Much of the underlying
reasoning that has gone into the making of a non-judicial precedent is never reduced to writing.
A complicating factor is that the reasons for the outcomes of non-judicial authorities’
constitutional activities are hard to fathom. Rational choice theory suggests that collegial
institutions such as the House or the Senate will reach inconsistent, incoherent results, in part
227 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 48-49 (“Clearly…precedent as a legal model
provides no guide to the justices’ decisions. […] All that one can say is that precedent is a
matter of good form, rather than a limit on the operation of judicial policy preferences.”).
228 See Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 922-963 (exploring the various ways in which the Court’s
precedent rarely imposes strong path dependency on constitutional adjudication).
229 See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT
1-12 (2004); see also Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1018, 1021 (1996) (stating that “precedent can serve as a constraint on Justices acting on their
personal policy preferences”).
230 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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because of the different orderings and intensities of preference among its members.231 Without
knowing the orderings or intensities of preferences, it may be hard to know why the House or the
Senate did what it did. Nevertheless, the outcome may take on a life of its own; an acquittal in
an impeachment trial may, for instance, depend more on how subsequent generations have come
to understand it than on what senators said at the time they rendered judgment. Yet, the reasons
given for particular actions may also matter. Just as the significance of a judicial precedent may
oftentimes depend on the quality, or persuasiveness, of its reasoning, the same could be said of
non-judicial precedent. To understand why particular senators voted in the ways that they did (in
impeachment trials or on other matters), it helps if they were to have explained their votes;
however, not all senators will provide such explanations. Moreover, members of Congress might
have had different reasons for their votes, might have prioritized the reasons for their votes
differently, and might not have disclosed fully (or perhaps at all) the reasons for their votes.
President Clinton’s impeachment trial is another precedent whose meaning is hard to nail
down. At the end of Clinton’s trial, only 72 senators formally explained their votes.232 These 72
included 34 of the 45 Democrats who voted not guilty on both articles of impeachment, four of
the five Republicans who voted not guilty on both impeachment articles, and three of the five
Republicans who voted not guilty on the first article but guilty on the send article. With most of
the senators voting guilty on both articles not bothering to explain their votes publicly, we are
left to speculate about the precise reasons for their votes. While more than half of those voting
to acquit Clinton explained their votes, we still do not know for sure why the Senate voted to
231 See Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J.
OF POL. SCI. 245 (1979).
232 GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 175 (describing the views expressed in the written statements
of senators released in the aftermath of Clinton’s acquittal).
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acquit Clinton, and we still face the challenge of finding the common ground among the
statements that we do have.
Similarly, the precise meaning or significance of the nation’s second impeachment is
unclear. It involved District Judge John Pickering, whom the House impeached on March 2,
1803, by a vote of 45-8.233 The impeachment articles charged drunkenness and profanity on the
bench and the rendering of judicial opinions based neither on law nor fact. Although Pickering
did not appear on his own behalf before the Senate, his son filed a petition claiming that
Pickering was so ill and deranged that he was incapable of exercising any sound judgment
whatsoever and that he should therefore not be removed from office for misconduct attributable
to insanity. Nevertheless, the Senate voted 18-2 to accept evidence of his insanity, 19-7 to
convict, and 20-6 to remove from office. Consequently, he became the first federal official to
have been impeached and removed from office.
Yet, disagreement among scholars and members of Congress persists about whether
Pickering’s removal established a precedent for removal based on non-indictable misconduct,
i.e., misbehavior that is violative of some criminal law. On the one hand, Simon Rifkind,
counsel for Justice Douglas in the House’s impeachment inquiry against him in 1970, suggested
Pickering was charged “with three counts of willfully violating a federal statute relating to the
posting of bond in certain attachment situations, and the misdemeanors of public drunkenness
and blasphemy.”234 On the other hand, some experts claim that “no federal statute made
violation of the bond-posting act a crime, nor obviously were drunkenness or blasphemy federal
233 Id. at 50-51.
234 Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
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crimes. The Pickering impeachment [confirms] that the concept of high crimes and
misdemeanors is not limited to criminal offenses.”235
Either of these views has merit, “because the question of guilt was put in the form of
asking senators whether the judge stood guilty as charged,” rather than whether the acts he
allegedly committed constituted impeachment offenses.236 The Senate’s votes to convict may
not reflect an acknowledgment by the Senate that violations of impeachable offenses were
actually involved. Indeed, five senators withdrew from the court of impeachment when the
Senate agreed to put the question in the form of “guilty as charged.” Two senators – both
Federalists – objected to procedural irregularities and claimed that the question put to them failed
to ask whether the charges actually described high crimes and misdemeanors. 237 John Quincy
Adams claimed that the other senators who withdrew – all Republicans – objected to procedural
irregularities but did not want to separate from their party by voting to acquit the judge.
A related problem with using the Pickering impeachment and removal as a precedent is
that the party fidelity seems to have played a major role in the Senate’s votes to admit the
evidence of insanity and to remove Pickering. All 19 of the Senate’s votes to acquit the
Federalist judge were cast by Republicans, while Federalists cast the seven acquittal votes. 238
Even the seemingly bipartisan vote to admit evidence on Pickering’s insanity can be explained
on partisan grounds: The Federalist senators may have wanted to introduce this evidence
because they hoped that proof of his insanity would have led to an acquittal given their position
235 Id. (citation omitted).
236 Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
237 Id.
238 Id.
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that insanity was not an impeachable offense, while the Republicans might have expected the
admission of the evidence to lead to the judge’s conviction because they thought it demonstrated
the need to remove him before he damaged the political system any further. In any event, the
party-line voting was consistent with an apparent Republican strategy to employ the
impeachment process to create vacancies in the federal judiciary by ousting Federalist judges, of
which on of the easiest to remove was Pickering.239
B. Additional Complicating Factors. The path dependency of non-judicial precedents is
complicated by several other factors. First, any given non-judicial activity may not have a
single, fixed meaning. For instance, the failure to act has legal significance in both judicial and
non-judicial fora. The fact that legislatures may have failed to do certain things – such as
foregoing criminal prosecution of homosexual activity on a wide scale basis – may be significant
to the extent that the Court recognizes this failure as constituting a tradition.240 Moreover, the
Senate Judiciary Committee might have failed, for various reasons, to hold hearings or votes on
pending judicial nominations.241 But, the absence of a hearing does not rob the event of
precedential significance. It might have been the result of a chair’s decision simply not to
schedule a hearing or a vote, and the Chair might have done this with, or without, consultation
239 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 165, at 127-128.
240 There is no consensus on how to determine, or even to approach, tradition as a relevant
source in constitutional interpretation. Consequently, non-judicial authorities routinely disagree
on a wide range of issues relating to tradition, including how to find it.
241 See Hatch, supra note 18, at 486 (arguing that a number of Clinton nominees did not get
hearings because they lacked requisite paperwork or were nominated too late in the
Congressional session to allow meaningful Committee consideration); Carl Tobias, Federal
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998) (referring to the
Judiciary Committee’s “inability or reluctance” to hold hearings for, and vote on, nominees);
Helen Dewar, Estrada Abandons Court Bid, WASH. POST, Sep. 5, 2003, at A01 (explaining that
Senate Republicans “bottled up” nearly 60 of President Clinton’s Judicial nominees).
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with other members of the Committee.242 A committee’s prior failures to hold hearings are
precedent on the basic authority of its chair to schedule hearings or votes as he see fit.
Yet, this is hardly the extent of the legal significance that committee inaction may have.
In the absence of a formal hearing, there is no occasion – and no need – for either the Chair or
the committee’s meetings to explain themselves. The Senate rules provide, however, that a
nomination lapses and becomes void if it is not approved or acted upon by the end of the
legislative session in which it was made.243 Senate rules invest inactivity with some significance.
Failures to hold hearings or votes make the significance of inactivity malleable. Such failures
can mean almost anything – or nothing, depending on the interpreter’s needs. Thus, the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s failure to hold a hearing on President Clinton’s nomination of Elena
Kagan to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia means different things to
different senators. For some, it means nothing, for the Committee never held a hearing or vote
on her nomination.244 For others, the failure to hold a hearing or vote resulted from the need to
accommodate other pressing business. For still others, the failure was the consequence of a
longstanding impasse between Democrats and Republicans over whether the court’s caseload
justified filling a vacant seat.245 For others, the failure was a consequence of the desire to keep
242 Senator Durbin seemed to regard the Republican blockage of several of President Clinton’s
nominees as a precedent in his decision to reject President Bush’s nomination of Charles
Pickering. See 148 CONG. REC. S 1915, 1918 (2002).
243 S. DOC. NO. 106-1, R. XXXI § 6 at 55 (2003).
244 See Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments, S. HRG. 108-35, Pt. 1, 11-12 (Jan. 29,
2003) (statement by Sen. Leahy).
245 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Janice R. Brown, of California, To be
Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, S. HRG. 108-463, 4 (Oct. 22, 2003) (statement
by Sen. Durbin).
63
the seat open for the next President to fill for others.246 And for still others the failure to hold a
hearing for Kagan was driven by a desire by some senators to prevent the confirmation of a
potentially activist judge. Each of these interpretations is credible, and all can be measured in
terms of how well it fits the facts.
A similar interpretive challenge arises even when the Judiciary Committee formally
recommends not sending nominations to the full Senate. Only occasionally do Committee
members explain their votes before casting them. Senators tend to be most expansive in high-
profile hearings, as demonstrated in the confirmation proceedings on John Roberts’ nomination
as Chief Justice. 247 With the proceedings covered by national media including television,
senators had strong incentive for being there for as much as possible. The committee members
each had lengthy statements, and each had relatively long questions – or comments – to pose to
the witness. In lower profile proceedings, the record tends to be more incomplete. Even when
senators explain their votes, they may not make full statements, and it is possible their statements
do not include all the reasons for their votes. Many statements might draw from prior
proceedings, but not because the latter are binding, but rather because they are persuasive
authority. Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s rejection of President Bush’s nomination of
Priscilla Owen to the Fifth Circuit in 2001 meant different things to Democrats and Republicans.
Many Democrats construed the event as an instance in which they blocked confirmation of a
246 See Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments, S. HRG. 108-35, Pt. 1, 7 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(statement by Sen. Leahy).
247 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S 10631, Sep. 29, 2005 (containing statements from various
senators explaining at length the reasons for their votes on the Roberts nomination).
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nominee with a judicial ideology with which they disapproved,248 while most Republicans
construed Owen’s rejection as driven by a petty desire for payback for Republicans’ failure to
confirm some of President Clinton’s judicial nominees or hostility to any jurisprudential outlooks
other than liberal activist ones.249 A similar interpretive problem arose with respect to the
Demorcrats’ successful filibuster against President Bush’s nomination of William Pryor to the
Eleventh Circuit in 2003. Many Democrats defended the filibuster as precluding the
confirmation of a conservative ideologue or activist,250 while some Republicans charged that
Pryor’s opposition was based on anti-Catholic bias.251 The arguments opposing his nomination
were identical to those held by devout Catholics, including opposition to abortion.
A second, related factor limiting the path dependency of non-judicial precedent is that its
meaning, like that of all precedents, depends on the interpretations of other actors. There can be
so many opinions expressed in support of the outcome of a particular event that subsequent
decision-makers have great leeway in choosing on which, if any, of those opinions to rely in
similar or analogous events. Such is the case when, for instance, the full Senate votes on
particular nominations. The significance of a particular vote depends not just on how senators
construe it at the time they vote but also how subsequent senators understand it. Thus, events
such as the Senate’s rejections of President Washington’s nomination of John Rutledge as Chief
248 See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2002, at A1.
249 Audrey Hudson, Texas Judge Rejected for the Federal Bench; Came under Fire for Being a
Court ‘Activist,’ WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at A4.
250 See Bob Dart, Democrats Block Vote on Judgeship, ATLANTA J. CONST. Nov. 7, 2003, at
15A.
251 See Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Advances Amid Dispute over Religion, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2003, at A17.
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Justice and President Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork do not have firmly fixed, clear
constitutional significance. Their meaning depends in significant part on how subsequent
senators construe them. Rutledge’s rejection is often cited as the first instance in which the
Senate rejected a nominee based on his ideology,252 while others argue that the rejection had at
least as much to do with concerns about sanity.253 Depending on the commentator, Bork’s
rejection stands as a watershed event in which the Senate targeted nominees because of their
ideology,254 payback for Bork’s firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox and other
misdeeds,255 and Bork’s confirmation conversion in which he appears to have abandoned prior
positions he had taken for the sake of getting confirmed.256 Others believe it resulted from the
convergence of many factors, including President Reagan’s belated defense of Bork against
public attacks and Bork’s alienating many senators in his public testimony.257
A third factor complicating the path dependency of non-judicial precedent arises from the
basic congressional norm of the members’ recognizing that each has the freedom to render his or
252 See GERHARDT, supra note 34, at 51-52 (2003).
253 See HENRY FLANDERS, THE LIVES AND TIMES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT 640 (William S. Hein 1971) (1875).
254 See NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK AND
THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 247 (1998); Senator Orrin Hatch, The Dangers
of Political Law, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1351 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTATION OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989)); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 133 (1994).
255 See, GERHARDT, supra note 34, at 163; CARTER, supra note 254, at 168.
256 ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 241-
246 (1989).
257 See, GERHARDT, supra note 34, at 83. See also, Michael Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1386-1391 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTATION OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989)); CARTER, supra note 254, at 168.
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her own independent judgment on constitutional matters.258 In practice, this means that
legislators are free to challenge procedures or prior judgments (made by committees or the entire
bodies) that they regard as unconstitutional. Their independence extends to making their own
determinations in fact-finding and figuring out what standard governs their decision-making in
different contexts. For instance, in Supreme Court confirmation hearings, senators recognize
that they each may decide for themselves the burden of proof that nominees must meet.259
Similarly, in removal trials senators have long recognized that they may decide for themselves
on the applicable burdens of proof (preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, or
beyond a reasonable doubt) and evidentiary rules (pertaining to such things as the relevance,
reliability, or hearsay).260 Thus, previously rendered constitutional judgments have limited
relevance for subsequent decision-making. An individual senator may feel obliged to follow his
or her earlier practice in addressing the same constitutional question(s), though this is not always
the case.261 Other senators feel free to follow whatever they regard as the best, or most
persuasive, course of action on the constitutional matter at hand.
258 See generally Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 707 (1985).
259 GERHARDT, supra note 34, at 314.
260 GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 112-16.
261 Senate-majority leader Bill Frist, who has vigorously protested the use of the filibuster on
judicial nominees, had previously participated in filibusters against President Clinton’s judicial
nominees. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, THE REPUBLICAN FLIP-FLOP ON FILIBUSTERS
(2003), http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?doc_name=sr-108-1-199. The broader
point is that Senators are not bound by their prior positions on constitutional matters. See
GERHARDT, supra note 131, at 41.
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C. The Ramifications of Disparate Entrenchment. Non-judicial precedent is entrenched
in at least three ways. Each way illustrates how the more entrenched a precedent becomes the
more path dependency it will be able to generate.
1. Legislative Inertia. The first means by which non-judicial precedent becomes
entrenched is by legislative inertia or institutional resistance to change. Several factors account
for such resistance.262 One reason that judges or justices may not deviate from one of their prior
rulings is because they refuse to change their minds. This is equally true for non-judicial
authorities, who may resist deviating from established policies or practices because of
stubbornness, refusal to acknowledge error, or belief in the policies’ or practices’ merits.
Partisanship bolsters this resistance to changes in policies or practices. The more central
a particular policy is to a party’s identity or success the harder party leaders will work to keep
their party unified in preserving it. 263 In addition, undoing an established policy may be difficult
because certain constituencies have become attached to it. Thus, it is generally harder to abolish
or revise an existing policy than it is to get the policy enacted in the first place. Imagine the
difficulty of trying to abolish tax cuts that the Republican Congress enacted shortly after
President George W. Bush took office.264 The tax cuts are a central element of the Republicans’
262 See Earl M. Maltz, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: The Dark Side of State Court
Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 997 (citing “bicameralism, the committee system, and other
vagaries of parliamentary procedure” as disincentives for legislating in the absence of strong
advocacy by political groups).
263 See generally DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 1-16
(1991) (discussing various factors that influence party voting).
264 See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38.
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agenda, they are popular with core constituencies throughout the country, and the alternative –
restoring some higher taxes – is anathema to them.
In his insightful book Disjoined Pluralism, Eric Schickler proposes how institutional
change occurs in the Congress.265 His model integrates rational choice theory with historical
institutionalism. He suggests that institutional change does not occur simply because a sufficient
number of members of Congress have recognized that change is in their self-interest or because
the institution has been structured to accommodate change. Instead, he argues, “that the
dynamics of institutional development derive from the interactions and tensions among
competing coalitions promoting several different interests.”266 According to Schickler,
institutional development deriving from such forces has at least four distinct features. First,
“Multiple collective interests typically shape each important change in congressional
institutions.”267 Change is achieved when it is being sought because “multiple interests, and the
interactions among coalitions promoting these interests typically determine the effects of each
change.”268 Besides producing change, the change produced might have “unintended effects”
because of tensions among the multiple interests. Second, “[e]ntrepreneurial members build
support for reform by framing proposals that appeal to groups motivated by different
interests.”269 Innovators in the legislative process “succeed by devising proposals and framing
265 ERIC SHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).
266 Id. at 4.
267 Id. at 12.
268 Id. at 13.
269 Id. at 14.
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issues in ways that appeal to distinct member interests.”270 Third, “Congressional institutions
typically develop through an accumulation of innovations that are inspired by competing
motives, which engenders a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting
structures.”271 Schickler acknowledges that the “layering process” institutional development “is
in some ways path dependent . . . The options available to decision makers today depend on prior
choices.”272 Because there may be “constituencies dedicated to the preservation of established
power bases [,] . . .institution-builders often attempt to add new institutions rather than dismantle
the old.”273 Fourth, “[a]doption of a series of changes intended to promote one type of interest
typically will provoke contradictory changes that promote competing interests.”274 The problem
with emphasizing path dependence in institutional development is that the “emphasis on
continuity underestimates the incidence of major changes in congressional institutions… Rather
than pushing Congress in one particular direction, the multiple interests motivating members
produce a more wayward, or even oscillatory, trajectory.”275 Thus, rather than ever achieving
“equilibrium” (as some social scientists have claimed), the Congress operates
as [a] multilayered historical composite[] that militate[s] against any overarching order in
legislative politics. Congressional development is disjointed in that members
incrementally add new institutional mechanisms, without dismantling preexisting
270 Id. at 15.
271 Id. at 15.
272 Id. at 16.
273 Id.
.
274 Id.
275 Id.
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institutions and without rationalizing the structure as a whole… The resulting tensions
mean that significant numbers of members will ordinarily be dissatisfied with established
ways of doing business. This enables entrepreneurs to devise innovations that serve as
common carriers, momentarily uniting those dissatisfied with the status quo. As a result,
institutional development is an ongoing, open-ended process. The interplay of coalitions
promoting contradictory objectives produces institutions that are tense battlegrounds
rather than stable, coherent solutions.276
Schickler’s model supports what I am suggesting is the process by which entrenchment
occurs in Congress. First, it shows how difficult change can be within the Congress and
particularly how change at the institutional level has tended to occur because of the
convergence of a number of different forces (or coalitions) coming together in favor of certain
change(s). It is important to keep in mind that innovators within the legislative process do not
operate on a blank slate. They are part of a system with a lot of formal and informal
mechanisms and procedures already in place. Their objective is to change the status quo in
some way, and the status quo includes some resistance to change.
Second, change is not always possible in the legislative process. Even if innovators were
constantly trying to change certain aspects of the institution, they cannot change everything at
once. At a given moment (or period), some things are and indeed must be stable. No
institution can accommodate total, constant change. Thus, the ongoing tensions within
Congress transform it into the “tense battlefield” that Schickler describes, but only some
skirmishes are won and, even then, not always quickly or all at once. This dynamic is equally
true for policy-making. Members of Congress lack the time, will, and resources to redo every
276 Id. at 17-18.
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policy that has been previously enacted. If Shickler’s model holds true for major policy
changes, then we would expect they derive from different coalitions coming together for
different reasons to support a major change in preexisting policy. Major changes within the
legislative process are not likely to result from a single factor.
2. Repetition. A second way in which entrenchment – or imperviousness to
change – may occur is through an institution’s repeated refusals to change. Repetition helps to
explain why, for instance, some prior decisions are harder to undo than others. Such has been
the case, for instance, with the Congress’ refusals to expand or contract the size of the Supreme
Court since 1869.277 The failure of President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan to win
congressional approval fortified this trend; it is the closest the Congress has come, since 1869,
to approving a change in the Court’s size in retaliation against the Court or a president. While
this refusal does not foreclose Congress from tinkering again with the size of the Court, the fact
that the Congress has refrained from doing so for almost 150 years places a heavy burden of
persuasion on those seeking to overcome it. Similarly, the Congress has not enacted a court-
stripping measure since at least 1930 that would preclude Supreme Court or other Article III
court jurisdiction over certain constitutional claims.278 While the House did approve such a
measure in 2004 stripping all federal jurisdictions over challenges to state and federal Defense
of Marriage Acts, the Senate never approved it.279
277 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 93, at 34 n.43.
278 Id. at 351.
279 See 108 CONG. REC. H6580 (2004). See also Jessica Vascellaro, House Passes Ban on Gay
Marriage Rulings Would Bar Decisions by Federal Judges on States’ Recognition, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, July 23, 2004, at A2. The Senate rejected a constitutional amendment that would limit
marriage to opposite sex couples by a procedural vote of fifty to forty-eight. 108 CONG. REC.
S7962 (2004)).
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Non-judicial precedent may become entrenched through repeated acceptances of an
institution’s actions. The Senate, for instance, has generally accepted that presidents may use
their power to make recess appointments to fill certain offices temporarily, regardless of the
reason or timing for the vacancy. This has been true for recess appointments of Article III
judges,280 in spite of the claim that it would be unconstitutional for a judge without life tenure
to exercise the power of an Article III court.281 Presidents zealously have protected their
prerogative to make these kinds of temporary appointments, and the Senate has accepted these
appointments. Recently, Democrats retaliated against President Bush’s recess appointment of
William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit by exacting a promise from him not to make any recess
appointments to Article III courts in exchange for their agreeing not to filibuster all but his
most controversial nominees to the federal appellate courts.282 The agreement did not include
Pryor, whose recess appointment was simply the most recent of more than 300 such
appointments to Article III courts, including the Supreme Court, since 1789.283 Similarly, the
280 Paul Solomon, Comment, Answering the Unasked Questions: Can Recess Appointees
Constitutionally Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 631, 632
(1985).
281 See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (1985); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704
(1962).
282 See Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse Over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004,
at A19; Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations; Bush Vows He
Won’t Use Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A21.
283 Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1011 (1985). See also Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess
Appointments to Article III Courts 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 656, 659 (“Prior to the Pickering
and Pryor appointments, president had made recess appointments to the federal judiciary only
twice since 1964.”).
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Congress has accepted unilateral trade agreements284 and military operations in the absence of
declarations of war,285 bolstering the status of these events as precedent.
3. Rules. Formalized rules provide the means for most deeply entrenching a
particular practice. This is especially true for a frequently ratified, or re-approved, rule. A
prime example is the filibuster, which has become entrenched through Senate rules (by
requiring a super-majority to end filibusters of motions to amend the rules)286 and its repeated
approval – and use – in the Senate.287 The filibuster has become entrenched through the rule
impeding amendment of the Senate rules, and the ultimate failure of the attempt by a
Republican majority in 2005 to circumvent the rules – by means of the so-called “nuclear
option” – to dismantle Rule XXII extended the Senate’s unbroken practice of only amending
its rules in accordance with its rules. 288
One significant problem with the nuclear option is that it is unprecedented. Both the
Senate Parliamentarian and the Congressional Research Service found that Senate precedents
284 Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 U.S. Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 232, 234-235 (1994) (noting that historical practices have established that the
President may negotiate and Congress approve major international trade agreements outside of
the Treaty Clause).
285 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
286 S. DOC NO. 106-1, R. XXII §2, at 21.
287 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S 5453, 5501 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman) (arguing that the use of the filibuster ensures that minority views are respected, and
that the filibuster has been used by Republicans and Democrats alike to block judicial nominees
in the past).
288 See 151 CONG. REC. S 5828, 5828-29 (daily ed. May 24, 2005) (statement of Sen. Byrd)
(lauding the resolution of the “nuclear option” debate by the “gang of fourteen”); see also Carl
Hulse, Bipartisan Group in Senate Averts Judge Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A1
(providing an overview of the agreement reached by the “gang of fourteen”).
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do not support the nuclear option. 289 Thus, filibustering judicial nominations depends on the
willingness of a critical mass of senators to follow Senate precedent, as it has been understood
within the Senate, or to create an entirely new one. The risk of the nuclear option is that it
would support a majority’s changing the rules whenever it suited them to do so. Such a
precedent would signal the end of the written rules of the Senate as binding authority within
the Senate over time.
Rule XXII is not the only Senate rule binding future legislatures. One study indicates
that the Senate had eight rules requiring super-majority voting.290 Near the end of Clinton’s
impeachment trial a motion was made to alter the Senate’s rule requiring closed deliberations
on the President’s guilt; the Senate recognized its rules could be changed only by
supermajority vote and failed to muster the requisite votes for an amendment, even though this
allowed an earlier Senate rule to remain in effect.291 If a past Senate lacked the authority to
bind the hands of a future one, then the Senate acted illegally when it voted to reject the motion
to open to the public its final deliberations on Clinton’s guilt. No one has ever suggested Chief
Justice of the United States William Rehnquist as Presiding Officer and the Parliamentarian
failed to recognize, much less to prevent, the supposed breach of the Constitution engendered
by this procedure.
289 See Geoff Earle, Parliamentarian Would Oppose “Nuclear Option,” THE HILL, April 14,
2005 (reporting that the Senate Parliamentarian determined that Senate precedents did not
support the “nuclear” option); Betsy Palmer, Congressional Research Memorandum: Changing
the Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or “Nuclear” Option, April 5, 2005 (suggesting that
implementing the “nuclear” option required disregarding Senate precedents).
290 Richard S. Beth, Congressional Research Service Memorandum, Supermajority Vote
Requirements Currently in Effect in Congress, 3-4 (January 20, 1995).
291 145 CONG. REC. 1069, 1071-72 (Jan. 28, 1999) (Amend. 1, 44-55, Amend. 2, 43-55).
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D. The Multiple Functions of Non-Judicial Precedent. Even if a particular non-judicial
precedent were not entrenched, it would not lack significance. Non-judicial precedent, like its
judicial counterpart, performs many functions besides constraining constitutional decision-
making. I examine a few of these below.
1. Non-Precedent as a Modality of Constitutional Argumentation. Non-judicial
precedent functions as a modality of constitutional argumentation. Non-judicial authorities are
mindful of the fact that they create precedent each time they act.292 Indeed, a sure way to
defeat a proposal is to point out that it has never been done that way before.293 Senator Lyman
Trumbull provided a famous instance of a senator’s refusing to take certain action because of
the precedent it would set when he refused to convict President Johnson because it would have
meant that “no future President will be safe who happens to differ with the majority of the
House and two-thirds of the Senate on any measure deemed by them important.” 294
292 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S 898, 955 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2006) (statement of Sen. Thune)
(opposing the creation of a federal fund for victims of asbestos poisoning on the grounds of the
precedent such a fund might create); see also 145 CONG. REC. S 1462, 1497 (1999) (printed
statement of Sen. Abraham) (considering the precedent that would be set regarding what is
acceptable Presidential behavior by not convicting President Clinton on the articles of
impeachment).
293 See, e.g., CONG. WILLIAM S. WHITE, CITADEL: THE STORY OF THE U.S. SENATE 74 (1957)
(“To the [Senate type,] precedent has an almost mystical meaning and where the common run of
members will reflect twice at least before creating a precedent, the Senate type will reflect so
long and so often that nine times out of ten he will have nothing to do with such a project at all . .
. His concern for the preservation of Senate tradition is so great that he distrusts anything out of
the ordinary . . .”). See also 145 CONG. REC. S 1660, 1663 (1999) (statement of Sen. Inhofe)
(opposing a censure resolution against President Clinton because there is no precedent for
censure in the Constitution or in the impeachment context); 145 CONG. REC. S 2898, 2908 (1999)
(statement of Sen. Thomas) (arguing that a second vote to allow China to accede to the World
Trade Organization should not be required because it would be unprecedented).
294 See, e.g.., REHNQUIST, supra note 165, at 243-44 (quoting Senator Trumbull) (citation omitted
in the original). For other examples, see 152 CONG. REC. S 35, 99 (daily ed. Jan 25, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Ensign) (arguing that confirming judges on basis of partisanship, and not
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A recent example of non-judicial precedent as constituting a modality of argumentation
arose in the deliberations over whether to deploy the “nuclear option,” which would have
allowed a majority of the Senate to bar judicial filibusters without following the Senate
rules.295 Some senators opposed the option for setting a bad precedent allowing a majority to
disregard the Senate’s rules for amending the rules whenever it was inclined to do so.296
Precedent was a significant mode of argumentation during President Clinton’s
impeachment proceedings. 297 The critical question before both the House and the Senate was
the extent to which Clinton’s misconduct resembled the misconduct of previously impeached
judicial experience, would set a dangerous precedent); 151 CONG. REC. S 5715, 5722 (daily ed.
May 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (arguing that changing Senate rules regulating
cloture would be to throw out precedent); 15 CONG. REC. H 3455, 3541 (daily ed. May 18, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Cox) (seeking to establish a precedent in voting on funding for a Homeland
Security authorization bill); See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 1775, 1778 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Sessions) (explaining he voted to convict President Clinton to set a good “precedent”).
295 See generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate
Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 205 (2004).
296 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S4806, 4807 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(“The strategy of a nuclear option will turn the Senate into a body that could have its rules
broken or changed at any time by a majority of Senators unhappy with any position taken by the
minority.”); Senator Robert Byrd, Address at Center for American Progress (Apr. 25, 2005)
(available online at http://byrd.senate.gov /speeches/2005_april/04_25_2005.html) (“If this
nuclear option is employed ... [t]here is nothing, then, except good sense ... to prevent majority
cloture of any filibuster on any measure or matter, whether on the legislative or the executive
calendar. Think of that! Rules going back for over 200 years and beyond ... can be swept away
by a simple majority vote”).
297 Arguments invoking precedent included those both for Clinton’s conviction and those against
it. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 1337, 1355 (1999) (statement by Rep. McCollum) (“Can you
imagine how damaging that would be to our constitutional form of government, to set the
precedent that no President will be removed from office for high crimes and misdemeanors
unless polls show that the public wants that to happen?”); 144 CONG. REC. H 11774, 11800
(statement by Sen. Lofgren) (“By [voting for conviction]…you will set the dangerous precedent
that the certainty of presidential terms, which has so benefited our wonderful America, will be
replaced by the partisan use of impeachment”).
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and convicted officials. For those urging his impeachment and removal from office, Clinton’s
misconduct was precisely the same as that for which three other officials were impeached and
removed from office in the 1980s – Harry Claiborne for income tax evasion and thus for
misconduct that had no formal connection to his duties as a judge, Alcee Hastings for perjury,
and Walter Nixon for making false statements to a grand jury.298 Some seeking Clinton’s
ouster likened his misconduct to the obstruction of justice set forth in the second article of
impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee against Richard Nixon.299 Clinton’s
defenders viewed his misconduct as unlike any prior misconduct for which officials had been
removed from office. Instead, they argued, it resembled either Richard Nixon’s alleged
income tax evasion for which the House Judiciary Committee decided not to draft an
impeachment article300 or the misconduct of Andrew Johnson – consisting of his failure to
abide by the Tenure in Office Act301 for which the Senate ultimately acquitted him.
2. Non-Judicial Precedent as Facilitating a Constitutional Dialogue. Non-
judicial authorities often render constitutional judgments in response to, or in anticipation of,
298 145 CONG. REC. S1791, 1792-3 (1999).
299 145 CONG. REC. S869, 873 (1999).
300 See 145 CONG. REC. S 1775, 1778 (1999) (statement by Sen. Sessions) (citing argument that
Nixon’s alleged tax evasion was not an impeachable offense because it was not directly related
to one of the President’s duties); see also Sen. Patrick Leahy, Procedural and Factual
Insufficiencies in the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, reprinted in 145 CONG. REC. S
1564, 1588 (1999) (citing Professor Tribe’s argument that Clinton’s behavior, like Nixon’s tax
evasion, presents no threat of becoming a model of emulation).
301 See Senator Joseph Biden’s Comprehensive Statement on Impeachment, reprinted in 145
CONG. REC. S 1462, 1481 (1999) (arguing that Clinton’s impeachment proceedings, like
Johnson’s, were motivated by “policy disagreements and personal animosity”).
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the judgments of other constitutional actors. They participate, in other words, in an ongoing
constitutional dialogue with the other branches.302
For instance, precedent became an important issue when President George W. Bush’s
then-National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, was deciding whether to testify under oath
before the September 11, 2001 Commission.303 The back and forth between Rice and the
White House on the one hand and the Commission on the other (as an agent of Congress)
constituted a classic constitutional dialogue. Initially, Rice refused based on her (and the
President’s) concern that such testimony was unprecedented. She claimed that no sitting
National Security Adviser had ever testified under oath before Congress or a congressionally-
created commission, and suggested that forcing her to so testify violated the principle of
executive privilege, which she construed as protecting absolutely the confidentiality of
conversations between the President and his advisers on national security matters. Public
pressure mounted in favor of her testifying, particularly after she had publicly appeared in
302 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1041
(1994) (“Congress and other non-judicial actors in our system have numerous ways to respond to
judicial decisions: to revise legislation, or to distinguish or develop the Court's pronouncements
on constitutional issues through new legal challenges.”); see generally LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988).
303 Dr. Rice initially refused to testify under oath before the congressionally-created commission
charged with investigating intelligence prior to the September 11, 2004 terrorist attacks against
the United States. Her refusal to speak with the Commission only behind closed doors and not
under oath sparked enormous controversy, particularly because at the same time she was
defending this refusal she appeared frequently on the media to rebut charges made against her
and the administration by other witnesses who had appeared before the Commission. After
intense public pressure (and requests from commission members from both parties), Rice
relented. See generally Philip Shenon, Rice Questioners May Avoid Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES,
April 8, 2004, at A25; Vincent Morris, Condi Won’t Say Sorry, N.Y. POST, April 8, 2004, at
A10; Greg Miller, Rice’s Comments to Face Scrutiny at Hearings, L.A. TIMES, April 8, 2004, at
A14; Charlie Savage, Rice Set to Detail Bush’s Side Testimony before 9/11 Panel As Seen as
Response to Clarke, THE BOSTON GLOBE, April 8, 2004, at A3.
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other fora (including the media) to counter statements made under oath by other witnesses
before the Commission. In the end, the administration allowed her to testify under oath based
on a special understanding, spelled out in a letter from the White House Counsel to the
Commission, that requested, inter alia, her appearance not be construed as a precedent with
respect to the testimony of White House officials before legislative bodies.304
The resolution of the conflict over Rice’s testimony shows how non-judicial precedent
may facilitate constitutional dialogues. The first is the perennial concern of governmental
leaders about the extent to which their actions form precedent. Obviously, they want to create
precedent that protects their prerogatives but otherwise keeps their options open in the future.
Second, the dispute over the conditions of Rice’s testimony demonstrated the absence of
any rules for guiding the construction or interpretation of non-judicial precedent. There was no
clearly governing precedent to settle the policymakers’ dispute, and the arguable relevance of
past events depended heavily on the meaning the contending sides gave to them. For instance,
Dr. Rice claimed, correctly, no sitting National Security Adviser had ever publicly testified
under oath before the Congress.305 Yet, the other side maintained, correctly, that the
304 See Letter from Chief White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez to Chairman Thomas Keane
and Vice-Chairman Lee Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United
States (March 30, 2004) (stating, inter alia, “we have now received assurances from the Speaker
of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate that, in their view, Dr. Rice’s public
testimony in connection with the extraordinary events of September 11, 2001, does not set, and
should not be cited as, a precedent for future requests for a National Security Adviser or any
other White House official to testify before a legislative body.”), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040330-3.html.
305 See Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel Rejects White House Limits on Interviews, N.Y. TIMES, March
3, 2004, at A12 (“A spokesman for the National Security Council, Sean McCormack, said
Tuesday that the White House believed it would be inappropriate for Ms. Rice to appear at a
public hearing as a matter of legal precedent. ‘White House staff have not testified before
legislative bodies,’ Mr. McCormack said. ‘This is not a matter of Dr. Rice's preferences.’”).
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September 9, 2001 Commission was unique. Moreover, President Clinton’s National Security
Adviser, Sandy Berger, though no longer presently occupying the office, had testified before
the 9/11 Commission even though President Bush Clinton controlled whatever Berger could
reveal that might have been clothed with executive privilege.306 In addition, Dr. Rice, as a
government officer, was obliged as a public official to tell the truth whenever she spoke to
public officials on national security matters.307 Thus, Dr. Rice helped to create a precedent of
public testimony that undercut her claim about not setting a precedent to testify publicly. The
agreement reached between Rice and the White House tracked a line of non-judicial precedent
extending from the administration of George Washington to the presidency of George W. Bush
in which accommodations are reached between presidents and members of Congress with
respect to executive privilege.308
Third, the dispute over the conditions of Rice’s testimony showed how far public officials
will go to control the meanings of the precedents at the time they are creating precedents. The
claim of the White House Counsel that Rice’s testimony should not be construed as creating a
precedent seems eminently reasonable given the uniqueness of the commission and unusual
pressure put on her to testify before the Commission. Yet, the White House’s claim was
pointless, given that the request made by Gonzales does not bind officials who remain free, as
they have done in the past, to cite any prior activity with which they approve as guiding or
306 On the development and law of executive privilege, see LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2003).
307 See NBC Nightly News, NBC News Transcript, (NBC television broadcast, March 25, 2004)
available at LEXIS (David Gregory reporting an interview with Chief White House Counsel
Gonzales where he indicated that Rice’s testimony under oath was “unnecessary, because
administration officials are duty-bound to tell the truth anyway.”).
308 See generally FISHER, supra note 305, passim.
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helpful precedent.309 The significance of Rice’s agreement to testify will be forged in an
ongoing dialogue about executive privilege in a legislative setting.
3. Non-Judicial Precedent as Shaping Constitutional History and Structure.
Non-judicial precedents perform historical and structural functions. I explore each in turn.
Non-judicial precedent performs several historical functions. First, they make
constitutional history, as did congressional legislation regulating slavery in the territories
before the Civil War.310 In Dred Scott,311 the Supreme Court struck down federal law
restricting expansion of slavery into a federal territory; it had been one in a series of
congressional compromises over slavery.312 Each compromise required members of Congress
to wrestle with the extent to which the Congress had the authority to regulate slavery within the
309 A classic example is President Ford’s request that the Congress not treat as a precedent his
testimony before it to explain his pardon of Richard Nixon. Ever since, Ford’s testimony has
been frequently cited as a precedent to support presidential testimony before the Congress and to
counter claims made by chief executives that they cannot be compelled to appear before the
Congress. See James V. Grimaldi and Dan Eggen, Criminal Probe of Pardon Begins; Gifts
From Ex-Wife of Rich Are Focus, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2001, at A1 (quoting Benton Becker, an
advisor to Ford on his pardon of Nixon who said, “I think President Clinton ought to take note of
President Ford’s openness, and candor and frankness with the Congress and the American people
back in 1974.”); Greg Miller and Maura Reynolds, Bush, Cheney Meet with Sept. 11 Panel, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, April 30, 2004 (indicating that Bush’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission was
the fifth time a president has been interviewed by an investigatory committee, including the
precedent set by Ford).
310 See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829, 232-
49 (2001).
311 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
312 See Bruce E. Fein, Original Intent and the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV. 196, 210 (1987)
(“From the 1820 Missouri Compromise to the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act…Congress struggled
with the issue of slavery in the territories. While legislative compromises did not settle the
slavery question, they held the Nation together.”).
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territories of the United States. These compromises held off secession and the Civil War, until
the Court barred their further use in Dred Scott.
Moreover, historical practices are not isolated; they are history in the making. So,
President Thomas Jefferson’s decision as president to forego congressional approval for the
Louisiana Purchase not only significantly expanded the United States but also set an important
precedent on the necessity for getting congressional approval for similar acquisitions in the
future.313 Similarly, President Jefferson’s decision to direct military force against the Barbary
pirates without congressional approval not only helped to eliminate a threat to American
commerce and lives but also was one of the earliest in a series of unilateral presidential
initiatives to employ military force without explicit congressional approval.314 More recently,
filibusters significantly impacted our history by preventing the Congress from approving any
civil rights bill from the Reconstruction era until 1958.315
Second, non-judicial authorities frequently do their own historiography. Non-judicial
authorities reach historical findings or put together their own histories of pertinent subjects or
events. For instance, many of the official memoranda of the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel include the office’s own historiography on pertinent issues.316 Opinions thus
313 CURRIE, supra note 311, at 112-13.
314 Id. at 124.
315 See ROBERT CARO, 3 THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 683-1012 (2002).
316 See, e.g., Deputization of Members of Congress As Special Deputy U.S. Marshals, 18 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 125 (1994) (arguing that deputization of members of Congress as special
Deputy U.S. Marshals is inconsistent with historical practices); Recess Appointments during an
Intrasession Recess, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 15, 16 (1992) (arguing that past practice suggests
that the President can exercise the recess appointment power during an intrasession recess of
eighteen days); Reimbursement for Detail of Judge Advocate General Corps Personnel to a
United States Attorney’s Office, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 188, 189 n.2 (1989) (arguing that
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become important for both the counsel and the historical support or background they provide.
The Senate Legal Counsel similarly relies on the Senate historian’s office and other institutions
to give the courts a sense of the history of Congress,317 and congressional committees routinely
undertake their own historical inquiries. Hence, in preparation for its hearings on President
Nixon’s misconduct, the House Judiciary Committee asked the eminent historian C. Vann
Woodward to coordinate an historical inquiry into the origins and scope of the federal
impeachment power.318 The ensuing study is still required reading for anyone interested in the
history of the federal impeachment process.
In undertaking their own historiography, non-judicial authorities construct their own,
valuable distillations of precedent. The Congressional Record is replete with Congress’ prior
constitutional activities, which can be assembled by anyone who wants to take the time and
effort to plumb through it to assemble them. Consequently, there are several noteworthy
compilations of congressional precedents.319 Moreover, members of Congress may direct
historical practices suggest the executive branch should not consider itself bound by legal
opinions of the Comptroller General when they conflict with legal opinions of the Attorney
General or Office of Legal Counsel).
317 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 132, at 75.
318 C. VANN WOODWARD, RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENT TO CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT (1974).
319 See 6-11 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNTIED STATES INCLUDING REFERENCES TO PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE
LAWS, AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 10-16; LEWIS DESCHLER & WILLIAM
HOLMES BROWN, DESCHLER-BROWN PRECEDENTS OF THE UNTIED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; LEWIS DESCHLER, PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 97TH
CONGRESS: A SUMMARY OF THE MODERN PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES OF THE HOUSE 86TH
CONGRESS-97TH CONGRESS (1982); 1-6 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING REFERENCES TO PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.
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constitutional questions to the Congressional Research Service, which routinely produces
memoranda describing and analyzing pertinent precedents. In addition, past presidential
decisions are reported in The Messages and Papers of the President, which includes executive
orders, veto messages, States of the Union Messages, and other official presidential directives
or actions. Different units within the executive branch as well as the White House Counsel’s
Office also compile useful distillations of precedent. They may record their own past
judgments or perhaps longer distillations of relevant precedents for some desired action(s). For
example, in 1966 the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office produced a memorandum
collecting over 125 incidents in which the President used the armed forces abroad without
obtaining prior congressional authorization.320
In addition, non-judicial precedent clarifies and shapes constitutional structure. Besides
sometimes settling conflicts among non-judicial authorities, non-judicial precedents may help
non-judicial authorities avoid such conflicts. They often show the paths that non-judicial
authorities need to follow in order to achieve their desired objectives.
International trade agreements are an excellent example of non-judicial precedent shaping
constitutional structure. Presidents and the Congress have worked out together several
alternatives for reaching international trade agreements. The first and most obvious is a treaty.
Ratification of treaties requires votes of approval by at least two-thirds of the Senate,321 but
questions regarding negotiation and termination of treaties have been largely left to the
political branches to work out between themselves. Over time, presidents have claimed the
320 Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Legality of
United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam (1966), reprinted in 1 THE VIETNAM
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk, ed., 1968).
321 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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prerogative to unilaterally terminate and to negotiate treaties, though both are often done with
substantial congressional consultation.322
A second alternative for international agreements is an executive agreement. Although
the Constitution does not mention executive agreements, they were known even in President
Washington’s day, and have become the predominant form of international agreement for the
United States.323 Even Congress has recognized the constitutionality of negotiating executive
agreements by enacting the Case Act, which requires the Secretary of State to transmit the text
of agreements other than treaties to each chamber for informational purposes.324
There are three types of executive agreement. First, treaty-based executive agreements
are made, as their name implies, pursuant to treaties.325 They enjoy the same legal status as the
treaties that authorize them so long as they are consistent with and within the scope of those
treaties. Second, congressional-executive agreements are those authorized by statute. These
agreements are complete alternatives to treaties.326 They are approved not by a super-majority
vote in the Senate but rather by majority vote in each chamber of Congress. Like treaties, these
agreements (including NAFTA) may become the supreme law of the land and thus supersede
inconsistent state laws and any inconsistent provisions in earlier treaties, other international
agreements, or statutes. Third, executive agreements are those international agreements that a
322 See JOHN N. MOORE, THE NATIONAL LAW OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 378-405 (2001).
323 B. Ackerman & D. Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HAR. L. REV. 801, 820 (1995).
324 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2004).
325 RESTATEMENT (3RD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. f (1987).
326 Id., § 303 cmt. e.
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president makes solely under his own authority.327 Thus, the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, may make armistice agreements. The questions whether particular agreements are
usually determined outside the courts, but even when litigated they have been approved by
courts. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a president’s authority to recognize
foreign governments is sufficient to authorize unilateral-executive agreements to settle issues
that are necessary to establish diplomatic relations.328
Also, without any interference or input from the courts, presidents and members of
Congress have worked out several routes by which the United States can be legitimately taken
to war.329 First, there is a declaration of war, which usually follows the incidence of war and
gives formal recognition to a preexisting state. 330 A declaration might also initiate hostilities if
it were, for instance, in the form of an ultimatum. A second option is a statute. Statutes may
become the basis on which a president may validly commit the armed forces to combat without
returning to Congress for further authorization. 331 Third, treaties may provide the basis for
military action. They may do this because they have, by virtue of Article VI of the
Constitution, the same legal force as statutes.332 Fourth, joint resolutions may provide a basis
327 Id., § 303 cmt. g.
328 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
329 See generally, W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
(1981).
330 Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1393.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 1394.
87
for using military force.333 In recent years, joint resolutions authorized military actions in
Kuwait, Afghanistan, and, most recently, Iraq. Last but not least, the context of an emergency
may provide the basis for warfare.334 Thus, military force may be used to rebuff an imminent
threat to American forces, national security, Americans abroad, or civil order. Just as with
international agreements, the constitutionality of taking the country to war by any of these
routes depends not on courts but on the judgments of national political leaders. Political
accountability, rather than judicial review, provides the primary check on these judgments.
4. The Educative Function of Non-Judicial Precedent. Among the most
important functions of any precedent is educating the public about constitutional law. This is
especially true of high-profile events, which are televised or widely covered by the media. For
instance, judicial nominees may learn from prior judicial confirmation hearings on what they
should say (or not to say) in order to get confirmed by the Senate. The Senate’s confirmation
hearings on Robert Bork’s nomination as Associate Justice have been described sometimes as a
seminar on constitutional law.335 In its aftermath, Senator Joseph Biden pointed to those
hearings as an example of the proper functioning of the Senate on Supreme Court
nominations.336 In the midst of the confirmation hearings on John Roberts’ nomination as
Chief Justice, Republican and Democratic senators disagreed over the extent to which the
333 Id. at 1365.
334 Id. at 1394.
335 See CARTER, supra note 254, at 6; Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1901 n.28 (2004).
336 See Joseph R. Biden, The Constitution, The Senate, and the Court, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
951 (1989) (arguing that the Senate should be able to reject judicial nominees on the basis of
their judicial philosophies).
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earlier confirmation hearings on Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s nomination to the Court provided an
example of either a candid or reticent nominee.337 Senators treated her hearings as instructive
on how forthcoming a Supreme Court nominee ought to be before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.338 Some senators and commentators referred to the 1987 confirmation hearings on
Robert Bork’s nomination as an Associate Justice as illustrating the problems with a judicial
nominee’s being too candid, or forthcoming, in his comments before the Judiciary
Committee.339 Immediately after being sworn into office, Chief Justice Roberts told his
audience what lesson his confirmation taught – that he (and thus they too should) understand
his Senate confirmation as a ratification of his belief that judging is distinct from politics.340
The Roberts hearings are hardly the only instance of non-judicial authorities’ efforts to educate
the public about the constitutional significance of particular constitutional events.
5. Shaping American Culture and National Identity. A final function of precedent
generally and of non-judicial precedent in particular is that it shapes our culture and national
identity. Non-judicial precedent gives culture specific content, and it constitutes the legal
337 See 151 CONG. REC. S 10461, 10467-68 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham) (approvingly reciting Justice Ginsburg’s refusals to answer questions in her own
confirmation hearings); but see 151 CONG. REC. S 9908, 9909 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Boxer) (suggesting that Justice Ginsburg was far more forthcoming than
Republican senators at the Roberts hearing were suggesting).
338 151 CONG. REC. S 9211, 9212-13 (July 28, 2005) (citing Senator Hatch urging the application
of the Ginsburg rule (“no hints, no forecasts, no previews” at the Roberts hearing).
339 See CARTER, supra note 254, at xi (lamenting the idea that “the Supreme Court should be
limited to people who have adequately demonstrated their closed-mindedness”).
340 John G. Roberts, Remarks upon being sworn in as Chief Justice (Sep. 29, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2005/09/20050929-3.html) (“I view the
vote this morning as confirmation of what is for me a bedrock principle, that judging is different
from politics…”).
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framework within which our culture develops. 341 Of equal importance, non-judicial precedent
is instrumental to the construction of national identity. For instance, the notion of “manifest
destiny” helped to define the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century; it
encapsulated the driving forces within the nation, particularly at its highest levels, to acquire
new territories and to expand the nation to include them. 342 More recently, the Bush
administration’s approval of warrant-less eavesdropping and reluctance to acknowledge any
limits whatsoever on the President’s authority in war time have sparked discussions about
whether these decisions are consistent with our national identity.343
V.
Normative Criteria for Evaluating Non-Judicial Precedent
The first four parts of this Article provide a comprehensive framework for analyzing non-
judicial precedent, while this final part explores possible criteria for evaluating non-judicial
precedent. Each criterion has costs and benefits.
341 See Post, supra note 12, at 77 (noting a “general truth: law is both a cultural product and a
vehicle for the regulation and discipline of culture”). Recall that Post equates “culture” with the
beliefs and judgments of nonjudicial actors.
342 See generally ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM AND THE
EMPIRE OF RIGHT (1995); FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, A REINTERPRETATION (1963); ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF
NATIONALIST EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1935).
343 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., What’s Left Unsaid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A19
(suggesting that wiretapping is corrosive to the First Amendment, “that cornerstone of free
speech”); Editorial, The War President: Spying without Oversight No Mere Matter of Trust,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 20, 2005, at 10 (arguing that the liberty fundamental to the American
system of government is “severely compromised by a president who finds it acceptable to spy on
citizens without so much as a secret court review…”); Editorial, Spying on Americans, THE
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2005, at B06 (arguing that “the tools of foreign intelligence are not
consistent with a democratic society”).
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A. Measuring Quality. There are various ways to measure the quality of a non-judicial
precedent. One is to evaluate the consistency in its production, maintenance, or construction.
Consistency is difficult to measure because a precedent is often amenable to more than one
plausible interpretation and thus may be subject to broad or narrow constructions, depending
on the interests of subsequent authorities to follow or distinguish them. Of particular interest
may be whether leaders are faithful to the precedents they helped to create or defer to ones
whose creation they had opposed. It is rare for national leaders to face precisely the same
constitutional question more than once, and when they do they reserve the right to change their
minds. This is precisely the sequence followed by the Congress in enacting the Independent
Counsel Act.344 Gravely concerned about the extent to which presidents and other high-
ranking authorities could avoid liability for breaking the law, the Congress enacted a law
insulating an independent counsel from the control of the authorities whom she was
empowered to investigate. Republicans questioned the act’s constitutionality, which the
Supreme Court upheld, with only Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting.345 Ten years later,
Democrats abandoned their defense of the law after Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr had
targeted President Clinton and recommended grounds to the Congress for his impeachment and
removal from office. After Clinton’s acquittal, Congress allowed the law to lapse, and we have
reverted back to the pre-1978 system which allowed the Attorney General to appoint a special
prosecutor and which defined the circumstances for his or her discharge. Concerns about
consistency did not lead any Democrats to change their minds on the desirability of the law.
344 28 U.S.C. § 591-99 (1994).
345 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1987).
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A second option for evaluating non-judicial precedent is assessing whether it was
correctly decided.346 The question is whether a particular practice is constitutional, regardless
of whether it is ever decisively settled or subject to judicial review. Thus, one might simply
ask whether the filibuster or a particular military action such as the war in Iraq is constitutional.
Third, one may measure members’ “entrepreneurial” leadership by examining their
relative success in changing constitutional law. Political scientist David Mayhew uses this
approach in evaluating the leadership of particular members of Congress.347 This approach
focuses on legislators’ achievements of their objectives. Consequently, non-judicial precedent
may be measured by the extent to which it helps to secure constitutional or other legal change.
This approach attaches less significance – indeed, none – to legislative attempts to preserve or
restore the status quo, even though they end up comprising non-judicial precedent.
A final criterion measures the extent of an institution’s commitment to a practice by
examining the resources invested on its behalf. The Congress, for instance, invests
considerable resources in constitutional counsel: Each chamber has its own legal counsel (and
staff), committees devote time and energy to studying certain constitutional questions,348 and
the Congressional Research Service exists in part to provide careful analysis of any
346 At the very least, whoever is evaluating the constitutionality of a particular activity will need
a mode for determining which constitutional interpretations are correct and which are not.
347 DAVID MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON
THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000).
348 See Keith E. Whittington, Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees,
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 132, at 87 (examining the public hearings of
congressional committees and finding that Congress considers a wide range of constitutional
topics).
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constitutional question submitted by a member of Congress.349 Moreover, it is possible to
measure the numbers of hearings devoted to particular subjects. Yet, the resources expended
might be misleading. They do not tell us who read any documents produced, how long
members of committees actually attend the hearings at which they are recorded as having
attended, the quality of members’ questions or statements, or how well members understood
the constitutional questions before them.
These standards are far from perfect. There is no settled norm that requires non-judicial
actors (any more than it requires Supreme Court justices) to adhere to constitutional decisions
to whose creation they objected. Moreover, most non-judicial actors appear pragmatic in
rendering constitutional decisions. This means that they are inclined to be sensitive to the
practical consequences, such as voter disapproval, of certain decisions.
B. A Case Study: The Filibuster. Recent conflicts within the Senate over the filibuster
have called attention to normative questions its persistent use raises. These questions merit
some attention here because they allow us to explore in greater depth the challenges of
developing normative criteria for evaluating non-judicial precedents.
1. Ensuring the Quality of Constitutional Debate. The constitution provides
several institutional safeguards for ensuring the quality of constitutional debate in the Senate.
The political accountability of senators, their unusually long terms, and the Senate’s function
as a counter-majoritarian institution to counter-balance popular passions have been designed to
prod senators to take the long, rather than the expedient, view in deciding constitutional
349 See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, CONGRESS AND
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 132, at 64 (discussing the Congressional Research Service as a
resource available to Congress to aid in understanding and deciding constitutional issues).
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questions.350 Add around-the-clock media coverage to the mix,351 and it would appear as if
there were many incentives for senators to rise above partisanship in deliberating over the
constitutionality of Rule XXII.
Measuring the quality of legislative debate is not easy,352 but by at least two, admittedly
imperfect standards the Senate debate in 2002 and 2003 on the need to reform Rule XXII was
mixed at best. One possible standard would be monitoring or measuring the extent of debate,
including the institutional resources devoted to debate. The latter measures only how much
formal debate on the filibuster occurred. According to this measure, the Senate debate on the
filibuster consisted of four hearings scheduled over the course of less than two months;353
350 Every source supports the Senate as a unique institution designed to resist popular pressure to
deliberate and to act upon the long-term interests of the Republic and the Constitution. See
generally Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 63-69 (1989)
(discussing the implications of the original design of the Senate as a counter-majoritarian
institution). For instance, consider the implications of the facts that the least populous states are
represented on a par with the most populous states in the Senate and that over 50% of the Senate
is elected by no more than 16% of the nation. Such design was intended to ensure that senators
would be less prone than their House counter-parts to implement simple, majoritarian
preferences. Whether this system operates as it was originally intended or designed is a question
to which political scientists have devoted considerably more attention than legal scholars.
351 See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997).
352 For one of the few exceptions to the general absence of legal scholars’ development of
criteria to measure the quality of constitutional discourse within the Senate, see the following
exchange: Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV.
707 (1985) and Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?
61 N.C.L. REV 587 (1983). Fisher and Mikva disagree over, inter alia, the extent to which the
members of Congress have the time, expertise, and interest to master constitutional analysis and
to which either the House or Senate devote special resources to support members in undertaking
constitutional analysis either generally or on specific occasions.
353 See Markup on S. Res. 138, S. Res. 148, S. Res. 178 Before the Senate Rules Committee,
108th Cong. (2003) (approving proposals to amend Rule XXII); Hearing on Senate Resolution
151, Requiring Public Disclosure of Notices of Objection (“Holds”) to Proceedings to Motions
or Measures in the Senate Before the Senate Rules Committee, 108th Cong. (2003); Hearing on
Senate Rule XXII and Proposals to Amend This Rule Before the Senate Rules Committee, 108th
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relatively sparse attendance at three of the four hearings (at three of the hearings, no more than
four members of the committees were ever present at the same time); a simple majority of a
committee was present at only one hearing, at which no Democrats attended; the committees
produced no findings or reports; the special evening sessions designed to embarrass the
Democrats featured only a few extended discussions about the constitutionality of Rule
XXII;354 and neither the Congressional Research Service nor the Office of Senate Legal
Counsel produced any official studies or reports to assist the committees. Perhaps most
importantly, the critical discussion culminating in a bi-partisan agreement among 14 senators
to oppose the nuclear option occurred behind closed doors. Only the agreement became
public,355 not the discussions leading up to them. The fallout from the agreement also occurred
away from the Senate floor and the committee rooms; it was informal and not part of any
official record of the Senate.
A second standard is measuring the consistency in members’ statements or votes,
particularly whether they would maintain their position if they were on opposite sides of the
Congress, (2003). Interestingly, at no point in any of these hearings did the Republican majority
address, much less reconcile their arguments with, the House’s rule requiring a super-majority
vote to approve tax increases. For a description of the rule, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE
UNITED STATES INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM
HERE 286-88 (1999); see also An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539
(1995) (critiquing the rule). Given the House rule and Rule XXII, one has to wonder whether
there is anything the Senate may not do in the rule-making process, i.e., whether there is a point,
even for defenders of the constitutionality of the filibuster, at which entrenchment can transform
into a constitutional difficulty within the legislative process. This is a big question, but a short
answer, for purposes of this paper, is that the Senate may adopt any procedural rule it wants as
long as it does it in accordance with its own rules.
354 See Neil A. Lewis, Marathon in the Senate: The Talk Is Long, but Temper Short, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2003, at A24.
355 Memorandum of Understanding on Judicial Nominations, 151 CONG. REC. S 5828, 5830-
5831 (daily ed. May 24, 2005).
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constitutional question before the Senate. This test measures the extent to which senators
seeking change have made arguments in good faith. An argument may or may not be sound,
but if a senator would only support an argument only when it helps him then one could fairly
accuse him of inconsistency if not lack of principle (assuming he has no coherent explanation
for his seemingly incoherent positions). Thus, this standard would have required asking
whether the Republicans who favored the impeachment and removal of President Clinton
would have favored impeaching and removing a Republican president who had engaged in the
same misconduct as Bill Clinton had committed. The debate over Rule XXII provides a decent
measure of the consistency of argumentation about filibuster. In 1995, Democratic Senators
Tom Harkin and Joseph Lieberman proposed amending Rule XXII almost precisely along the
lines suggested by Majority Leader Frist in 2003.356 A joint commission subsequently studied
the question, but the Senate took no action upon any of its analyses. A decade later, every
Democrat who had denounced the filibuster in 1995 changed positions to defended the
constitutionality of the filibuster while every Republican who had defended the filibuster in
1995 changed positions to question its constitutionality.357 Thus, many if not most senators
have taken conflicting stances on the filibuster and failed to rise above partisan concerns.
There are several plausible explanations for this failure. First, district court and appellate
court appointments tend to have relatively low political salience.358 There is no evidence
356 See 104 CONG. REC. S422 (1995). See also Ross Mackenzie, The Democratic Filibuster
Invites “Systemic Collapse,” RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, June 12, 2003, at A17.
357 See THE REPUBLICAN FLIP-FLOP ON FILIBUSTERS, supra note 260, passim; Donald Lambro,
Democrats Flip-Flop on Filibusters, THE WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A04.
358 Cf. Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Court
Judicial Nominees, 117 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 259 (2002) (suggesting, inter alia,
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indicating the public is either generally aware of, or is concerned about, lower court
nominations. Second, united government (in which the same political party controls the White
House and the Senate) generally lacks incentives for extended hearings or debate. Such was
the case, of course, with the filibuster debate.359 The final reason for the failure is that Senate
rules stacked the deck in the filibuster’s favor. The super-majority vote required to end a
filibuster of any motion to amend the rules is a high hurdle that, by design, is hard to meet.360
A change in perspective might allow one to view Senate Rule XXII differently. Rule
XXII makes its amendment difficult. It conditions revisions on widespread consensus. In the
senators’ scrutiny of judicial nominees have relatively low political salience except for periods of
divided government).
359 The proposal to amend Rule XXII went further through the legislative process in a united
than in a divided government. The Senate Rules Committee approved amending the rule in
2003, while no committee took any action on a similar proposal in 1995 in spite of a joint
commission’s inquiry into the subject. The reason is that with united government the party in
power had an incentive to protect those interests of the presidency that it considers to coincide,
or overlap, with its own. There was no such overlap when the Republicans controlled the Senate
during Bill Clinton’s presidency.
360 The fact that the Senate has not yet taken formal action on the “nuclear option” is telling.
The failure to act may signal different majorities on different questions, or perhaps the absence
of any majoritarian preference, within the Senate on the constitutionality of the filibuster. For
instance, the absence of floor action may derive from a majority’s support for the status quo,
though its composition (and the intensity of its members’ preferences) are unclear. There may
also be a majority that does not support the constitutionality of Rule XXII, though its
composition, too, is unclear. There may be a majority of senators who disapprove of Rule XXII
but for different reasons. An obvious reason for the failure of the nuclear option was the
bipartisan agreement among 14 senators to allow floor votes on some filibustered judicial
nominations, but the durability of the agreement is unclear. It may be possible that the nuclear
option has failed because the Majority Leader has not persuaded even his own side of the
authority of its position. There may even be a super-majority that favors amending Rule XXII in
accordance with the rules but not along the lines proposed by the Majority Leader. The literature
on the inherent difficulties of defining or clarifying majoritarian will is huge, but for some classic
works, see, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); KENNETH ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed., 1963).
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absence of such consensus, the default position is the status quo. The rule, in other words,
facilitates stability and order within the system. It creates an enormously high hurdle for change,
but it is not an impossible hurdle to clear. On four occasions, the requirements for cloture have
been significantly modified,365 but each time changed occurred it did so only in accordance with
the super-majority voting requirements. A mechanism that encourages arguments to have broad,
bipartisan appeal to effect change is another safeguard for ensuring the quality of constitutional
debate within the Senate.
The fact that no formal action has been taken – yet – to amend Rule XXII does not mean
that the debate on the constitutionality of the filibuster or efforts to amend it are over. As I have
previously suggested, inaction should never be confused with either indifference or the absence
of discourse. The formal debates on the filibuster do not reflect the full extent to which the
Senate engaged with the arguments over the constitutionality of the filibuster. Left out of this
picture is the significant discourse about the constitutionality of the filibuster that occurred in
numerous venues outside of the Senate chambers, including but not limited to party caucuses,
visits with or speeches to constituents, the hallways in the Senate, the dining rooms, offices,
telephone exchanges, network coverage, newspaper commentaries, and lobbying by interested
parties (including academics). Senators are not nearly as restricted as judges in the range of
information – or evidence – that they may take into account or even seek out in the course of
deliberating on constitutional questions. While the Senate has yet to take any final action on the
Majority Leader’s proposal, one may safely assume that there were a number of informal
exchanges between the Majority and Minority Leaders and their respective caucuses over the
365 The most significant alterations to the filibuster were made in 1917, 1949, 1975, and 1985.
See DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, SPECIAL REPORT: A LOOK AT THE SENATE FILIBUSTER, No.
103-28, at 1 (1994).
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constitutionality of Rule XXII and their respective strategies for maintaining – or thwarting – the
filibusters against the President’s judicial nomination. (Indeed, one can safely assume these
exchanges occur only within, as opposed to across, the membership of each caucus.) This
extensive discourse about the constitutionality of Rule XXII cannot, and should not, be
discounted in measuring the quality of constitutional discourse within the Senate. Such
discourse is essential to meaningful deliberation within the Senate, because it constitutes the
manner in which senators receive background information on a problem. It is likely to enrich
constitutional deliberation, because, behind closed doors, senators will be more candid with each
other and avoid posturing. This discourse is consistent with – and has been encouraged within –
the design of the Senate, even though the full extent of this discourse can never be known.
The other problem with Rule XXII is not unique to the controversy over its
constitutionality or utility. It involves the weight, if any, to attach to historical practices as a
source of constitutional meaning. While the Supreme Court, for more than two centuries, has
emphasized the relevance of historical practices for determining the constitutionality of a
contested action,366 some scholars might question its relevance. They point to the absence of any
standard for distinguishing which practices ought to count and which ought not to count in
guiding constitutional interpretation. The longevity of a practice arguably constitutes a dubious
basis for its constitutionality given that some longstanding practices, such as segregation, are
generally regarded as unconstitutional.
366 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (upholding practice of legislative
prayers that began in First Congress and continued through “the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years”); Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (noting that
“an unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside” by constitutional challenge);
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (noting that “long settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional
provisions”).
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Many critics of Rule XXII have treated historical practices as irrelevant to the rule’s
constitutionality.367 They have taken this position in part because historical practices do not help
their cause. As we have seen, the filibuster has consistently been a practice within the Senate
throughout its history. Moreover, arguing against the entrenchment of the filibuster in Rule
XXII requires critics of the filibuster to argue for the institution to do something it has never
previously done, i.e., they want the Senate to amend its rules without following its rule.
The fact that the Senate has invariably amended its rules in accordance with its rules
carries enormous weight with many senators.368 As a practical matter, it raises the burden of
persuasion on those seeking change.369 Yet, as we have also seen, senators historically have
367 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, STAN. L. REV. 181, 249
n.401 (arguing that Rule XXII is just as unconstitutional as entrenched laws, omitting a
discussion of the Senate’s historical practice of making a distinction between entrenched laws
and rules); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 445, at 475-476 (2004) (explaining two ways critics of Rule XXII dismiss dispose of
historical practices).
368 Proposals favoring cloture by majority vote were defeated in 1925, 1947, 1949, and in every
Congress between 1961-1975, with the exception of 1971 when there was no vote on the
question. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 99TH CONG., SENATE
CLOTURE RULE, LIMITATION OF DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF RULE XXII OF THE STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (Comm. Print 1985)
[hereinafter SENATE CLOTURE RULE]. See also Complete List of Cloture Votes Since Adoption of
Rule 22, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 317, 317 (February 9, 1974).
369 The major problem with relying on historical practices as a possible source of constitutional
meaning is not just the absence of a standard for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate ones
but also the fact many people do not trust the Congress to make altruistic judgments about the
scope of its own power. The concern is that the Congress will be prone to make judgments in its
own institutional self-interest about the scope of its powers, particularly if its members know
courts may defer to (and perhaps not even review) those practices. This concern might serve as a
good reason for not allowing historical practices to be absolutely binding on either the courts or
the Congress, but it does not justify depriving them of any relevance to constitutional
interpretation. Institutional self-interest does not necessarily lead to indefensible or even
incoherent results. It sometimes might lead members of the Congress to make judgments that
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reached their own judgments about, for instance, the relevance of ideology in confirmation
proceedings, the burden of proof in a vote on whether to approve a presidential nomination, and
the burden of proof and the rules of evidence in impeachment proceedings. The normative
weight of a non-judicial precedent, within the Senate, is thus a function of the extent to which
senators choose to defer, or not to defer, to it.
The normative weight of a non-judicial precedent outside the Senate is a different matter,
and one over which the Senate understandably has limited control. Its only control over how
much other authorities defer to its practices is to provide persuasive authority for them. Thus,
the Senate has an institutional incentive to invest resources in creating and formulating non-
judicial precedent, so that the public and other branches have confidence in its constitutional
judgments. As a practical matter, the officials in other branches remain free to disagree with
either the outcomes of Senate proceedings or the bases for the Senate action or inaction. Even
then, there may be political costs for presidents who interfere (at least openly) with the internal
operations of the Senate. One can, for instance, suspect but not prove that President Bush, or at
least his agents, strongly encouraged Republican senators, or their staffs, to consider amending
Rule XXII to ease the requirements to invoke cloture. There is a fine line between
encouragement and pressure, and senators may be offended by pressure from the President on
how they should do their business. Even from a popular president, senators will not appreciate
being told how to wield their institutional prerogatives. Such pressure, for instance, persuaded
James Jeffords to switch parties,370 it eroded relations between Jimmy Carter and the Democratic
increase the public’s confidence in what they do as well as to facilitate stability, order, or even
efficiency in the operations of the institution.
370 See Richard L. Berke, News Analysis: A Question of Governing from the Right, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2001, at A1.
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senators he had urged to adopt merit selection panels (and thus diminished the extent to which he
would have deferred to senatorial courtesy in judicial nominations);371 and it had no apparent
effect when the Republican-controlled Senate refused to adopt President Bush’s urged it in 2002
to schedule committee and floor votes on every judicial nomination.372
In the case of the filibuster, non-judicial precedent has significant weight. It falls within
an area in which the Constitution vests special power in the Senate to devise internal rules of
governance. The Senate’s procedural rules are matters that are of greatest importance to the
Senate itself, and the institution has devoted considerable resources to their maintenance,
including employing a full-time Parliamentarian and the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel to
provide counsel on the rules. The Senate has also considered the filibuster’s constitutionality
several times. Each time it has come down squarely on the side of upholding the
constitutionality of the filibuster. If a court were to have followed a similar pattern, most people
would be inclined to think overturning itself on the matter in question was not just becoming
increasingly difficult, but it would also appear to have been coming close to the point of
achieving closure on the matter in question. There is no reason to think differently about the
Senate’s posture on an issue it has repeatedly embraced.
None of this means that the filibuster is immune to amendment. Senators still “reserve
the right” to change their minds about constitutional judgments. This keeps some constitutional
questions open or unsettled. Moreover, senators always have the option of amending Rule XXII
371 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 260-264 (1997).
372 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Wants Fast Vetting on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2002, at
A18 (describing Bush’s proposal to impose a 180-day time limit for the Senate to vote on his
nominated judges).s
102
in accordance with the rules, a past course which has proven fruitful in lowering the number of
senators required to invoke cloture. Even apart from challenging the filibuster on constitutional
grounds, senators retain the discretion to question the utility of the filibuster. They may ask
whether it is good or bad, whether it helps or hinders the Senate. In the meantime, the starting
point for any discussion of the merits, or constitutionality, of the filibuster is not a blank slate.
The Senate’s historic practices constitute a serious obstacle to its dismantlement; they effectively
create a contestable presumption of constitutionality. The fact that this presumption is still intact
demonstrates another way in which entrenchment is a feature of the legislative process.
Conclusion
Non-judicial precedent makes many significant contributions to constitutional law. First,
the Supreme Court is shaped by non-judicial precedent in the form of choices made by non-
judicial actors about the Court’s size, composition, jurisdiction, and funding comprise different
sets of non-judicial precedent. Non-judicial authorities decide which views to represent on the
Court and which to keep off; they decide which Supreme Court cases they want to fortify with
their appointments or which ones they want to weaken through their appointments decisions.
Second, non-judicial precedent constitutes public practices to which the Court routinely
defers. Historical practices, tradition, customs, and norms are simply different sets of non-
judicial precedent on which the Court relies heavily in constitutional adjudication. Each of these
concepts refers to the past activities of some non-judicial actor(s), and each has the same status
in constitutional law as a set, or category, of non-judicial precedent.
Third, non-judicial precedent constitutes the tangible connection between what courts do
and culture. Courts operate within particular social, political, legal contexts, which in turn are
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shaped by the constitutional decision-making of non-judicial actors. Non-judicial precedent is
not restricted to the realm of governmental activity; it encompasses the full range of the activities
of public and private actors outside the Court.
Fourth, non-judicial precedent performs many functions within and outside courts. A
non-judicial precedent may, serve as a mode of constitutional argumentation; facilitate a public
dialogue about the Constitution, implement constitutional values, and shape national identity.
Fifth, non-judicial precedent may be categorized in directional and temporal terms. They
may constitute binding authority either within or across public institutions. Their endurance
depends on the support of non-judicial actors, as well as courts, over time.
Sixth, non-judicial precedent has limited path dependency. Several factors limit the
extent to which a non-judicial precedent – just like its judicial counterpart – constrains
constitutional decision-making, even in circumstances in which it is supposed to constitute
binding authority. These factors include the absence of a formal record for a good deal of
constitutional activity outside the Court, the lack of candor in setting forth the bases for non-
judicial activities, the different consequences of framing judgments as standards or rules, and the
dynamic of collegial bodies (such as legislatures) not to produce coherent, consistent results.
Seventh, non-judicial actors are primarily responsible for producing criteria for
evaluating judicial performance as well as their own constitutional decision-making. While there
is no consensus on the criteria they may employ, they may be held accountable for the quality of
their constitutional decision-making by the public, their colleagues, or other non-judicial actors.
Moreover, non-judicial precedent is as important as any other source of constitutional
argumentation. Even when non-judicial authorities consult other sources, they pay attention to
the kind of precedent they will make. Non-judicial actors know that once they make a
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constitutional decision it will become a precedent to guide decision-making within, and by, their
institution. This awareness is a check on their exercise of power.
Finally, non-judicial precedent underscores the significance of constitutional decision-
making outside the Court. The realm of non-judicial precedent is more extensive than that of
judicial precedent. Viewing constitutional law from the perspective of non-judicial actors calls
attention to the immense constitutional activity outside the Court that has significance quite apart
from what the Court decides within the confines of its relatively narrow jurisdiction. Shifting
perspective from judicial to non-judicial precedent illuminates how the most significant realm of
constitutional activity may be outside the Supreme Court.
